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A b strac t
This thesis presents a theoretical investigation into the monetary trans­
mission mechanism. In particular, I focus on heterogeneous information, in­
ventories, and credit-market imperfections as factors that help to propagate 
monetary disturbances to the economy in a way that can explain plausibly 
the observed effects of monetary policy.
First, I consider heterogeneous information among price-setters who can 
only observe the state of the economy through noisy private signals. I con­
struct a model which incorporates the imperfect common knowledge into 
the Taylor-Calvo staggered price-setting model. The average price chosen 
in each period depends on the higher-order expectations about not only the 
current state of the economy but also the future states during the periods 
the prices will be fixed. The response of inflation to a monetary disturbance 
is delayed following a sluggish initial adjustment of prices and the response 
of output is amplified by the imperfection in common knowledge. These 
results are robust when a noisy public signal in addition to private signals 
is introduced.
Secondly, I consider inventories by developing simple dynamic general 
equilibrium models which assume pre-determined prices and incorporate a 
production-smoothing motive and a sales-facilitating motive for holding in­
ventories. Inventories serve as a source of real rigidities, that is, amplify the 
persistence of the real effects of monetary policy. Inventories respond pro- 
cyclically and prices are adjusted gradually to a nominal disturbance only 
if the sales-facilitating motive is relatively strong enough; otherwise inven­
tories respond countercyclically and prices are adjusted excessively. I also 
consider the case where production as well as prices is pre-determined.
Lastly, I consider credit-market imperfections by examining a model 
which incorporates asymmetric information between lenders and borrow­
ers into a standard dynamic New Keynesian model. I calibrate the model 
using Japanese data and find that the large volatility of Japan’s corporate 
investment can be explained by taking account of the credit-market imper­
fections. Based on this model, I simulate alternative monetary policy rules 
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Introduction
This thesis presents a theoretical investigation into the monetary transmis­
sion mechanism. In particular, I focus on heterogeneous information, in­
ventories, and credit-market imperfections as factors that help to propagate 
monetary disturbances to the economy in a way that can explain plausibly 
the observed effects of monetary policy.
There are many mechanisms that co-operate in transmitting monetary 
policy shocks to the economy. The process begins with the open market 
operations which can affect market interest rates, and then the transmission 
may proceed through several channels. The interest rate channel is the pri­
mary transmission mechanism in both the traditional Keynesian macroeco­
nomic models and the New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium models. 
Given some degree of price stickiness, changes in the nominal interest rate 
translate into those in the real interest rate, which affect investment spend­
ing through the traditional “IS curve” or consumption spending through 
the Euler equation for households’ intertemporal allocation. Meanwhile, 
monetarists emphasize the transmission channels through changes in rel­
ative asset prices or relative quantities of assets, which include Tobin’s q 
theory of investment and wealth effects on consumption. Another channel 
is the credit channel which include the effects of credit-market imperfections 
through the quantity of bank loans (bank lending channel) and borrowers’ 
net worth (balance sheet channel)1. It has been studied extensively since 
1990s when many countries experienced large fluctuations in real economic 
activities accompanied by large swings in asset prices, and I study the case 
of Japan’s economy in Chapter 3. Although the above channels are not mu­
tually exclusive, many empirical studies have tried to assess their relative
1Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provides an extensive discussion on the role of the credit 
channel in monetary transmission.
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importance2.
In theoretical studies, a more fundamental problem has been tackled: 
why rather than how does monetary policy have real effects in the short 
run? Modern macroeconomic theory provides us mainly two explanations: 
imperfect information about the policy shocks and short-run rigidity in price 
or wage adjustment. The imperfect information approach was originally de­
veloped by Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972) in the era when the traditional 
output-inflation relationship collapsed. The costs of acquiring information 
have been emphasized mainly by monetarists as micro-foundation of several 
transmission channels3. Meanwhile, the recent New Keynesian dynamic 
general equilibrium models assume short-run rigidity in price or wage ad­
justment, typically adopting the staggered price-setting a la Taylor (1980) 
or Calvo (1983), and analyze the effects of interest-rate rules for monetary 
policy4.
It is not easy, however, for optimization-based theoretical models to ex­
plain the observed effects of monetary policy. While those models have been 
widely used in monetary policy analyses, several problems have been pointed 
out. The first is the persistence of the policy effects. The Phelps-Lucas im­
perfect information models imply that the real effects of monetary policy last 
only insofar as the precise public information about aggregate disturbances 
is unavailable, which seems contradictory to the observed persistence of busi­
ness fluctuations despite the availability of macroeconomic data with only 
short delays. Although some recent imperfect information models including 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Woodford (2003a) can generate persistent real 
effects of monetary policy, their results rely on assumptions of unrealistically 
too much unawareness or inattentiveness of economic agents. Meanwhile, 
the ability of the staggered price-setting models to reproduce quantitatively 
the observed persistence of business fluctuations are also subject to contin­
ued debate. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) argue that implausibly 
long periods of exogenous rigidity in price adjustment are required to gen-
2Other channels include the exchange rate channel, the cost channel, and the expecta­
tions channel. For example, Mishkin (1995) and van Els et al. (2001) provide an overview 
of those transmission mechanisms.
3Meltzer (1995) provides a monetarist perspective on the transmission process of mon­
etary shocks as well as a critique of the Keynesian perspectives.
4Woodford (2003b) provides a rigorous and extensive framework of New Keynesian, 
or Neo-Wicksellian as he calls, dynamic general equilibrium models and monetary policy 
analyses based on it.
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erate the realistically persistent output fluctuations. The second problem is 
the magnitude. Many empirical VAR evidences suggest that monetary pol­
icy shocks that induce relatively small movements in open market interest 
rates affect powerfully the real economy. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) use 
this result to support their argument that the credit channel amplifies the 
policy effects through the interest rate channel. The third problem is the 
co-movement in output and inflation. The widely used Calvo-type staggered 
price-setting implies that the price level jumps in the period of disturbance 
and inflation responds earlier than output, which is contradictory to the 
stylized fact shown in many empirical studies that monetary policy shocks 
initially impact on real variables and then have a delayed and gradual effects 
on inflation.
The following chapters in this thesis are my attempts to develop optimization- 
based monetary business cycle models that can overcome some of the above 
problems. The model in each chapter incorporates a key factor that helps to 
propagate monetary disturbances to the economy in a way that can explain 
plausibly the observed effects of monetary policy. In C h ap ter 1, I fo­
cus on heterogeneous information among price-setters who can only observe 
the state of the economy through noisy private signals. I construct a model 
which integrates the Woodford (2003a) imperfect common knowledge model 
with the Taylor-Calvo staggered price-setting model. The average price cho­
sen in each period depends on the higher-order expectations about not only 
the current state of the economy but also the future states during the peri­
ods the prices will be fixed, which makes the initial adjustment of prices to a 
monetary disturbance more sluggish than that in both the static imperfect 
common knowledge model and the full-information staggered price-setting 
model. The response of inflation to a monetary disturbance is delayed fol­
lowing the sluggish initial response and the response of output is amplified by 
the imperfection in common knowledge. Heterogeneous information which 
features in this chapter also plays important roles in the following chapters: 
heterogeneity in the length of the decision lag for price-setting is considered 
in Chapter 2 and asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers 
is assumed as the micro-foundation of the financial accelerator effects in 
Chapter 3.
In C h ap te r 2 , I focus on inventories. I develop simple dynamic gen­
eral equilibrium models which assume pre-determined prices and incorporate
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a production-smoothing motive and a sales-facilitating motive for holding 
inventories. One of the main challenges in this chapter is to incorporate 
those inventory-holding motives in a way that is consistent with the styl­
ized facts on inventories. Inventories respond procyclically and prices are 
adjusted gradually to a nominal disturbance only if the sales-facilitating 
motive is relatively strong enough; otherwise inventories respond counter­
cyclical^ and prices are adjusted excessively. When incorporated into the 
models in an appropriate way, inventories amplify the persistence of the real 
effects of monetary policy, as Blinder and Fischer (1981) argued in their 
non-optimization-based model.
In the models in Chapter 1 and 2, monetary policy is defined as just a 
disturbance driving a stochastic process of aggregate nominal spending and 
neither the interest rate channel nor any other specific transmission channels 
are explicitly considered. In C h ap te r 3 , 1 focus on credit-market imperfec­
tions by examining a model based on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) 
which incorporates asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers 
into a standard dynamic New Keynesian model, where the credit channel 
as well as the interest channel is explicitly considered. The model exhibits 
financial accelerator effects, the mechanism whereby credit-market imper­
fections help to propagate or amplify various types of shocks including mon­
etary policy shocks to the economy. I calibrate this model using Japanese 
data and find that the large volatility of Japan’s corporate investment can 
be explained by taking account of this mechanism. Based on this model, I 
simulate alternative monetary policy rules specified in terms of an interest 
rate instrument and evaluate their performances.
Although the models in this thesis overcome some problems in the exist­
ing optimizing-based monetary business cycle models, they capture only a 
few aspects of the whole picture of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
In particular, the models in Chapter 1 and 2 are too simple for practical 
uses such as policy and empirical research. Meanwhile, the baseline mod­
els in those chapters are so tractable and flexible that some extensions can 
be easily done. In Chapter 1, I extend the baseline model by introducing 
a noisy public signal as well as private signals, which provides interesting 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy such as commitments and 
transparency when the public signal is interpreted as a communication tool 
of the monetary authority. In Chapter 2, I extend the baseline model by
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considering the case where production as well as prices is pre-determined. If 
the decision lag of price-setting is longer than that of production, inventories 
respond countercyclically at first and then move procyclically, which is con­
sistent with the pattern shown in empirical studies. I also develop a more 
realistic model for quantitative experiments. I hope those models serve as 
useful building blocks for future research in various directions.
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Chapter 1
Imperfect Common Knowledge, 
Staggered Price-Setting, and the 
Effects of Monetary Policy
This chapter proposes a model that integrates the Woodford (2003a) imper­
fect common knowledge model with the Taylor-Calvo staggered price-setting 
model in order to explain plausibly the observed effects of monetary policy. I  
drop the Woodford’s unrealistic assumption that all price-setters never know 
the widely available data on the aggregate demand nor even the actual quan­
tity they sold at their own price, and instead assume that the true state of 
the economy is revealed to all price-setters with a delay of one period. With 
staggered price-setting, however, the model can generate persistent real ef­
fects of monetary policy. The average price chosen in each period depends on 
the higher-order expectations about not only the current state of the economy 
but also the future states during the periods the prices will be fixed, which 
makes the initial adjustment of prices to a monetary disturbance more slug­
gish than that in both the static imperfect common knowledge model and the 
full-information staggered price-setting model. I  show analytically that the 
response of inflation is delayed following the sluggish initial response and the 
response of output continues to be amplified. These results are robust when 
a noisy public signal in addition to private signals is introduced.
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1.1 Introduction
Modern macroeconomic theory provides us mainly two explanations for why 
monetary policy has real effects in the short run: imperfect information 
about the policy shocks and short-run rigidity in price or wage adjustment. 
The imperfect information approach was originally developed by Phelps 
(1970) and Lucas (1972) in the era when the traditional output-inflation 
relationship collapsed. However, their arguments were soon criticized for 
their practical irrelevance: the Phelps-Lucas model implies that the real ef­
fects of monetary policy last only insofar as the precise public information 
about aggregate disturbances is unavailable, which seems contradictory to 
the observed persistence of business fluctuations despite the availability of 
macroeconomic data with only short delays1. Nowadays many macroeco­
nomic models of business fluctuations assume short-run rigidity in price or 
wage adjustment, typically adopting the staggered price-setting a la Taylor 
(1980) or Calvo (1983), in order to analyze the long-lasting real effects of 
monetary policy.
Meanwhile, some authors have recently reconsidered the imperfect infor­
mation approach and developed monetary business cycle models that can 
generate persistent real effects of monetary policy and can also overcome one 
of the main problems in the Taylor-Calvo staggered price-setting approach, 
namely the incapability of explaining the observed inflation inertia. Mankiw 
and Reis (2002) consider sticky information rather than sticky prices, which 
means parts of the current prices are chosen on the basis of old information. 
Woodford (2003a) considers imperfect common knowledge about nominal 
disturbances in an environment among monopolistically competitive suppli­
ers whose optimal pricing strategy depends not only on their own estimates 
of the aggregate disturbances but also on their expectations of the average 
estimates by other suppliers. These models can explain in particular the 
stylized fact shown in many empirical studies2 that monetary policy shocks 
initially impact on real variables and then have a delayed and gradual effects
1Lucas (1975) develops a monetary business cycle model that can generate persistent 
real effects of monetary policy by introducing capital accumulation as well as information 
lags. The persistence can also be generated by introducing inventories into monetary busi­
ness cycle models based on imperfect information without assuming any nominal rigidity, 
as I will show in Chapter 2.




However, those models practically still leave the original problem in the 
Phelps-Lucas model unsolved. The source of persistence of the real effects 
of monetary policy in the Mankiw-Reis model is the outdated information 
that influences on current price-setting. In their model there are always 
some part of suppliers who set their prices using very old information, as 
the probability of obtaining new information in each period is constant and 
identical among all suppliers regardless of how long it has been since their 
last update. In the Woodford model, all suppliers never know (or pay atten­
tion to) the precise information about the aggregate demand nor even the 
actual quantity they sold at their own price. They choose their prices only 
on the basis of the history of their subjective observations which contain 
idiosyncratic perception error. In both models, the persistent real effects 
of monetary policy would disappear if the true state of the economy were 
revealed to all suppliers with a delay of only one period. They still fail 
to explain why price-setters do not use the widely and quickly available 
macroeconomic data in their model.
In this chapter I propose a model that integrates Woodford’s imper­
fect common knowledge model with the Taylor-Calvo staggered price-setting 
model in order to overcome the problems in each of them and explain plau­
sibly the observed effects of monetary policy. The model is based on the 
standard set-up of monopolistic competition developed by Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987), where each firm’s desired price depends on their observa­
tion about the overall price index and the output gap. Following the Wood­
ford model, I assume that the price-setters can only observe the state of the 
economy through noisy private signals that is idiosyncratic to each individ­
ual observer so that the overall price is described as the weighted sum of their 
“higher-order expectations,” that is, what others expect about what others 
expect ... about the aggregate demand3. Meanwhile, unlike the Woodford 
model, the true state of the economy is revealed to all price-setters with a 
delay of one period. The source of persistence of the real effects of monetary 
policy in this model is the staggered price-setting. The average prices chosen 
in each period depends on the higher-order expectations about not only the
3Keynes (1936) pointed out the role of higher-order expectations in an asset pricing 
context by introducing the famous metaphor of financial markets as “beauty contests.” 
Recently, higher-order beliefs have been extensively studied in the theoretical literature 
on “global games” (Morris and Shin, 2003) and applied to various fields.
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current state of the economy but also the future states during the periods 
the prices will be fixed, which makes the initial adjustment of prices to a 
monetary disturbance more sluggish than that in both the static imperfect 
common knowledge model and the full-information staggered price-setting 
model. Although the higher-order expectations about both current and fu­
ture states are very complicated, the model can be solved by virtue of the 
assumption that the true current state will become common knowledge in 
the next period.
The main results of the model are as follows. The response of inflation 
to a monetary disturbance is delayed following the sluggish initial adjust­
ment of prices. The response of output is amplified by the imperfection in 
common knowledge in the period of disturbance and then continues to be 
larger than that in the corresponding full-information staggered price-setting 
model, which is nested by my models as a special case, even after the precise 
information about the initial shock becomes common knowledge. I show the 
above results analytically first in the baseline model where imperfect com­
mon knowledge is incorporated into a simple two-period price-setting model, 
and then in more general price-setting models which allow for multiple- 
period staggered price-setting including the one analogized with the Calvo- 
type price-setting. The Calvo-type price-setting has a problem that the 
price level jumps in the period of disturbance and inflation responds earlier 
than output, which is contradictory to the stylized fact I mentioned above. 
The above results imply that this problem can be overcome by incorporating 
imperfect common knowledge into the Calvo-analogized model. Moreover, 
my imperfect common knowledge model can overcome the problem in the 
Woodford’s imperfect common knowledge model that the response of output 
is relatively weak compared with the Calvo-type price-setting model.
The baseline model is tractable and flexible enough for various exten­
sions. In particular, I extend it by introducing a noisy public signal in 
addition to the private signals in order to study the consequences of more 
general information structure following Hellwig (2002) and Amato and Shin 
(2003). These authors emphasized the separation of information into pub­
lic and private signals. The baseline model only focuses on the private 
signals and lack considerations for problems in informational interaction 
among decision-makers as well as for the availability of macroeconomic data. 
Whereas Amato and Shin assume price-setters never know the precise infor­
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mation like the Woodford model, I keep the assumption that the true state 
of the economy is revealed to all price-setters with a delay of one period. I 
show that the provision of the public signal alleviates the sluggishness in the 
initial adjustment of prices to some extent but the results in the baseline 
model such as the delayed response of inflation and the amplified response 
of output are robust.
The public signal in the extended model may represent noisy information 
provided by the media, the government, or preliminary data to be revised. 
When it is interpreted as a communication tool of the monetary authority, 
the model has interesting implications for the conduct of monetary policy 
such as commitments and transparency. As Morris and Shin (2002) argued, 
public information in an economy where decision-makers’ information sets 
are heterogeneous has a disproportionately large effects on their decisions. 
While the provision of the public signal alleviates the sluggishness in the 
initial adjustment of prices to monetary disturbances, it exposes firms to 
additional disturbances, namely informational noise, and could destabilize 
the economy. Although I do not seek to derive policy or welfare implications 
from the models in this chapter, the extension to introduce the public signal 
is important for providing a building block for further extensions in those 
directions as well as for checking the robustness of the results obtained from 
the baseline model.
While this chapter is related to the two strands of literature, imperfect 
common knowledge and staggered price-setting, the attempt to integrate 
them, as far as I know, has never yet been made. It has been sometimes ar­
gued, however, that imperfect information and nominal rigidities are closely 
related to each other as a plausible explanation for the real effects of mon­
etary policy. Ball and Cecchetti (1988) develop a model in which monopo- 
listically competitive firms gain information by observing the prices set by 
others and then under certain conditions the staggered price-setting arise en­
dogenously as the equilibrium outcome. Kiley (2000) develops a model with 
both costs of nominal price adjustment and costs of information acquisition 
in order to identify empirically the degree of price stickiness. He concludes 
that the negative relationship between the persistence of detrended output 
and average inflation in cross-country data is consistent with his endogenous 
sticky price model where price stickiness acts as a persistence-generating 
mechanism. Although the staggered price-setting in my models is assumed
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rather than explained endogenously, my integration approach could be jus­
tified by those previous studies as well as by the results I will show in this 
chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, 
I describe the baseline model and show the main results on the effects of 
monetary disturbances. In Section 1.3, I extend the baseline model by in­
troducing a noisy public signal in addition to private signals and examine 
the effects of informational disturbances as well as monetary disturbances. 
In Section 1.4, I consider more general price-setting environment including 
the one analogized with the Calvo-type price-setting. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Baseline M odel
In this section I incorporate imperfect common knowledge into a simple 
two-period staggered price-setting model and then examine analytically the 
effects of monetary disturbances.
1.2.1 Set-up
Consider an economy where a continuum of monopolistically competitive 
firms indexed by i G [0 , 1 ] produce their individual-specific goods and set 
their prices. Goods are perishable and there are no capital to accumulate as 
a factor of production. I begin with the following static optimal price-setting 
condition of firm i4.
p*t (i) = E ip t + <t>Eiyu 0 < (j> < 1. (1 .1 )
All variables are expressed in logs. Pt(i) is i ’s desired price in period t  and 
would be the actual price if they could set their prices flexibly, pt is the 
overall price index and yt is the output gap. The parameter (j> is assumed to 
be less than unity so that their price-setting decisions are strategic comple­
ments. When the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods is 
higher or the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output is lower, this 
parameter value is smaller and the strategic complimentarity is stronger.
Firms cannot observe precisely the aggregate variables such as pt and yt 
even in the current period t. Moreover, their information sets are heteroge-
4This condition can be derived from a standard monopolistic competition model such 
as Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
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neous, which is the main feature of this model. Accordingly the expectation 
operators conditional on t ’s information set as of t, E\, are added to pt and 
yt in the above equation. I will describe details of the private information 
set and the signal extraction problem in the next subsection.
Then I introduce the two-period staggered price-setting a la Taylor (1980). 
In period £, half of firms in the economy set their prices for the current period 
t  and the next period t -1-1. They must set the same prices for both periods, 
which means prices are not just pre-determined but fixed. The price chosen 
by firm i who sets its price in t is given by5
x t ( i )  =  \ ( p U i ) + E i p * t + i ( i ) )  (1-2)
=  \  iE t Pt +  ^  El Vt + El pt+i +  <j> El yt+1).
In period 1 4-1 the other half of firms set their prices for t  -I-1 and t +  2, in 
period t  + 2 the firms who set their prices in t  re-set their prices for t  4- 2 
and t +  3, and so on. The overall price index is given by
Pt =  i  i) (1.3)
where Xt is the average price chosen by the firms who set their prices in t, 
that is, Xt = 2  J0° ' 5 xt(i) di when t  = • • •, —2 , 0 , 2 , • • •, and xt =  2  Jq5 xt(i) di 
when t = • • •, —1 , 1 , • • •.
Lastly, I specify the demand side of the economy by introducing an 
exogenous stochastic process for aggregate nominal spending as follows.
m t -  mt- 1  =  P (m t-i -  ra*_2) -I- a et , et ~  AT(0, 1) (1.4)
where
m t = pt-\-yt (1-5)
and et is Gaussian white noise. One may interpret mt as “money” that 
households must hold for their spending. As shown in Christiano, Eichen- 
baum, and Evans (1998), the above process can be viewed as a plausible 
stochastic process for the actual money supply (M2) in the U.S. data. Alter­
natively, mt can be interpreted more broadly as a generic variable affecting 
aggregate demand. This simple specification for aggregate demand, however
5I assume that the discount rate applied to the firm’s profits in the next period is 
negligible for simplicity.
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interpreted it is, allows me to concentrate on examining the consequences 
of alternative specifications for price-setting behaviours. In my analysis be­
low, I suppose that the disturbance driving the above process for aggregate 
nominal spending is a monetary policy shock.
1.2.2 Signal Extraction
Here I specify the firms’ information set. As in Lucas (1972) and Woodford 
(2003a), each individual firm estimates the current state of the economy 
using their private information. In period t, firm i has access to a noisy 
private signal about the current aggregate demand, mt, as follows.
zt(i) = mt + au ut(i), ut{i) ~  N (0, 1) (1.6)
where ut{i) is Gaussian white noise distributed independently both of et and 
of ut(j) f°r all j  7  ^ i- Unlike the Woodford model, this model assumes that 
the true value of mt becomes common knowledge among all firms with a 
delay of only one period in t +  1. Therefore the information set of firm i 
consists of the private signal zt (i) and the history of realized aggregate nomi­
nal spending The result of firms’ signal extraction for estimating
mt is given by
E lt mt =  E{mt \ zt(i), m t- i, m t- 2 , ...]
= bzt(i) +  (1 -  b) {mt- i  + p (m t_i -  mt_2)} (1.7)
where
h _  v 1
represents firms’ relative reliance on their private signals, which is higher 
when the precision of the signals is higher (au is smaller) given the variance 
of aggregate nominal spending.
1.2.3 Higher-Order Expectations
Unlike the Lucas model, this model considers an environment among mo- 
nopolistically competitive suppliers whose pricing strategy depends on the 
other suppliers’ strategies. The prices chosen by the suppliers depend not 
only on their own estimates of the current aggregate demand but also on
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their expectations of the average estimate among the other suppliers, their 
expectations of the average estimate of that average estimate, and so on. 
Averaging (1.7) over i, I have
E t mt = bmt + ( l - b ) { m t - i  + p (m t- i-~ m t-?)}
= b a e t +  { m t - i  + P ( mt- i  ~  m t- 2)} ,  (1.8)
where E t is the average expectations operator. The second line implies 
that the average estimate is not equal to the true value of m* defined by 
(1.4) despite the assumption that the mean of private signals is equal to the 
true value. The average estimate is more close to the true value when the 
precision of the private signals is so higher that firms relatively more rely 
on them. When au =  0, all firms can access to homogeneous precise signals 
and the average expectations operator no longer need to be defined.
The average expectations operator, defined in the case of heterogeneous 
information sets, does not satisfy the law of iterative expectations. The 
individual firm z’s expectation of the average estimate (1 .8 ) can be calculated 
as
E %t [ E t mt ]  =  b [ b z t ( i ) +  ( l - b )  { m t - i + p ( m t - i - m t - 2 ) } ]
+(1  -  b) {m t-i +  p (m t - 1  -  m t- 2 )}•
Averaging again over i, I have
E t [Et mt] = b2  mt + (1 -  b2) {m t-i + p (m t-i — m t- 2 )}
=  b2 a  et +  { m t - i  +  P { m t- \  -  m t- 2 )} ,
which is different from (1.8). Therefore I need to define the j -th order 
average expectations as follows.
T7l(0)______Et m t — rat
The higher-order average expectations can be calculated as
E\ [e[j) rat ] =  zt(i) + ( I -  bi+1) {m t - 1 +  p {mt- \  -  m t- 2 )} 
E t +Vi m t =  b? + 1  m t +  ( 1  -  b?+1) {m t- 1 +  p (raf_ 1 -  raf_2 )}
=  &J + 1  a et +  {rat_i +  p (rat-i -  ra t- 2 )}. (1-9)
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Since b is less than 1 , the infinite-order average expectation converges to the 
expectations conditional only on common knowledge about the history of 
realized aggregate nominal spending.
1.2.4 Solving the model
Now I seek to find a rational expectations equilibrium defined as a set of 
{Pt, Vt} which satisfies the model equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), and (1.5) 
given the exogenous process for aggregate nominal spending (1.4) and the 
information structure described in the preceding subsections. The key en­
dogenous variable in the model is the reset prices, xt. Combining equations 
(1.1) through (1.5), I have
®t(*) =  2  P* + $ Vt + &t Pt+i +  0 E\ yt+i)
=  + (1 -  </)) Elpt +  (f>Elmt+i + (1 -  0) Ejpt+i}
=  i  {</> El mt +  0 El mt+i + {l-<f>) E\ xt +  ^ -y ^  El x t+i 4- ^ y ^  x t- i }
=  ^{ 0  ( 2  +  p) El m t — <f>pmt-i
+ (1  -  0) E\ x t +  E\ xt + 1  +  **_!}.
The price chosen by firm i who sets its price in t  depends on its estimate 
of the current aggregate demand, m t, of the average price over the firms 
who set their prices in the same period, x t , and also of the future average 
price chosen by the other group of firms, xt+i. It also depends on the 
past realized aggregate nominal spending, m t- 1 , and the past average price 
chosen by the other group of firms, x t - 1 , which are known in period t  so
that the expectation operators need not to be added to these terms.
Averaging xt{i) over the group of firms who set their prices in t, I have
xt = + p )E t m t -<t>pmt-i +
( l - 4>)Et x t + E t x t + 1  + - ^ 4  (1 .1.0 )
where the average expectations operater is here defined as Et{') =  2 J0° ' 5  E\(') di 
when t = • • •, —2 , 0 , 2 , • • •, and Et(') = 2  Jq 5 El(-) di when t  = * * *, —1 , 1 , • • •.
Apart from the average expectations operator, the above equation can 
be viewed as a second-order difference equation for xt like the plain two-
20
period staggered price-setting model with full homogenous information sets. 
I suppose that all firms of both groups believe that the solution form of the 
difference equation is
xt = X xt- i  +  Ci m t- 1  +  C2 m t- 2  +  C3  a et , (1-11)
where A, Ci, C2 , and C3  are undetermined coefficients, though they cannot 
precisely observe the realization of aggregate disturbance, e*, nor xt in the 
current period t. The conjecture of this solution form will turn out to be 
correct by virtue of the assumption that the true value of x t will be revealed 
to all firms of both groups in the next period t + 1. Substituting this solution 
form into (1.10), I can eliminate the term of xt+1 .
xt = ^{(f> { 2  + p )E t m t -<t>pmt- i  + {l-(t> )E t x t
H— ^  Et Xt ^  Et mt ^ 2  m*-i) -^---2 ^  Xt~ ^
=  i  [{20 ( 2  +  p) +  (1 -  4) Ci} E t mt +  {(1 -  4>) C2  -  2 (j>p}mt- i  
+  (2 +  A) (1 — <f>) E t xt +  (1 — <f>) xt- 1 ]
Note that E \et+1 (= Etet+i) = 0 for all i. Then iterative substitutions for 
xt yield higher-order expectations about m*.
2 <f> (2 +  p) J- (1 — 4>) Ci ( (2 +  A) (1 — (f>)) * 1 — (j) 
4
_ _ _ _ _ _ ) ( l - « V
x t =--- ;--------------  2 ^  )  4 -------- f E t mt
j = 1  ^ }
( l - < t > ) C 2 - 2 <j>p 1 -<f>
4 -  (2 +  A) (1 -  <j>) _1 4 -  (2 +  A) (1 -  <j>) t_1 ( }
This implies that firms consider the weighted sum of higher-order expec­
tations up to the infinite order for choosing their prices. Using (1.9) to 
—(j)substitute for E t mt,  I obtain
_  & (2 (f> (2 +  p) +  ( 1  — (f>) C i }
X t ~  4 — (2 +  A) (1 — 0) 6 a e t
, 2 ^ (2  +  0) +  (1 — <p) C i  , . / %■.
---------------------------  { m t - 1  +  P (rrit-i — m t - 2 ) j4 — (2 +  A) (1 — 0)
4 - ( 2  +  A ) ( l - 0 )  4 — (2 +  A) ( 1  — 0)
Matching this with the solution form (1.11), I finally identify the values 
of undetermined coefficients that provide a stable solution of the difference
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equation for xt as follows.
A =  < 1
1  +  \ / 0
_  2 ^   ^ 2py/(j)(l +y/4> +py/4>)
c2
Cz
1 +  yR> (1 +  V<!>) {1 +  yf$~  p { l  — V^)}
2 p y / $ ( l  +  y/(j) +  P y/4>)
(1 +  \ / ? )  {1 +  V ?  “  P ( i  -  v W  
26\/^ (l + vW (i + V? + pV<F)
{ 4 - 6 ( 3 - 2 V ? - « } { 1  +  V ? - p ( 1 - V ? ) }
The set of equilibrium paths {p*, y t} can be calculated as
Pt =  ~ (A xt_i +  Ci mt_i +  C2 m t _ 2  +  C3  <7 et
+A iCf—2 +  Ci 7Tlt— 2 +  C2  TTlt—3 +  C3  (7 €t-l)
=  Apt-i +  — {Ci TTit—i  +  (Ci +  C2) Tnt— 2  +  c 2 7Ut-3 +  C3 a (e* H- et_i)}(1.13)
y t  =  tth -  X p t - 1  -  i  {Cl m«_i +  (Cl +  C2) mt_2 +  C2 m*_3 +  C3 <r (et  +  et_ i)}
=  A yt~i +  ( 1 — A +  p — — j  m t-i  — ( p + ----- ^--- ) m t-'2.
- i { C 2 mt_3 +  C3 o-(ef +  et_i)} (1.14)
1.2.5 Impulse Responses
From the solution of the model obtained in the previous subsection, I ex­
amine the impulse responses of output and inflation to a monetary dis­
turbance. I compare the responses in my baseline model with those in the 
full-information two-period staggered price-setting model in order to extract 
the effects of imperfection in common knowledge. The full-information two- 
period staggered price-setting model in which all firms can access to homo­
geneous precise information about the realization of the current aggregate 
disturbances corresponds to an extreme case, au = 0  so that b =  1 , in my 
baseline model6.
The impulse responses of price level and output to a unit positive in­
novation in eo are calculated as a set of equilibrium paths where eo =  1 , 
et = 0 for all t ^  0, p_i = t/_i =  0, and lim^oo yt = 0 in (1.13) and
6The other extreme case, 6 =  0, means all firms have no information about the cur­
rent aggregate disturbances, which corresponds to the case of pre-determined prices or 
information delays studied in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3 in Woodford (2003b).
22
(1.14). The paths {p t,V t} with 0 < b <  1 are the responses in the baseline 
model and the paths {Pt,Yt } with 6 = 1  are those in the full-information 
staggered price-setting model. The analytical results of the comparison are 
summarized in the following proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  1 .1 . i) The impulse response of output in the baseline 
model is persistently larger than that in the full-information staggered price- 
setting model, i.e.,
Vt > Y U t>  0.
ii) The impulse response of inflation in the baseline model is delayed and 
then persistently larger than that in the full-information staggered price- 
setting model, i.e.,
Pt ~ P t - 1 < Pt ~  P t- l, t =  0, 1.
P t - P t - i  > P t - P t - 1 , t>  2 .
P roof, i) Taking the difference between yt and Yt, I have 
f. _ Y  =  4 y ^ ( l  +  V ^  +  py/ff)___________ ( l -6)<7
V0 0 (i  +  V ^H l +  ^ - p C l - ^ }  { 4 - f r ( 3 - 2 V ^ - 0 ) }  
y i - Y i  =  (1 +  A) (yo — Yb)
V t - Y t = A (y,_i -  Yt- i ) ,  t>  2.
ii) Taking the difference between pt — p t-i  and Pt — P t-1 ,1 have 
4 \ / ^ ( l  +  \ / 0  + pV<i>) ( 1  — 6 ) cr
Po — Pq = —(1 +  y/(j)) {1 +  V ? — P (1 — V^)} {4 — 6  (3 — 2 — (j))}
(fii — Po) ~ (Pi ~ Po) =  A (po — Po)
(P2 - P i ) - ( A - A )  =  - ( 1  -  A2) (po -  Po)
(pt — P t-i) — (Pt — P t-i) = A {(p<-i — Pt-i) — (P t-i — P t-i) }> t  >  3.
The differences between my baseline model and the full-information stag­
gered price-setting model originate from the price adjustments in period 
0. The initial response of prices in the baseline model is more sluggish 
due to imperfection in common knowledge; accordingly the price adjust-
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ments are delayed and the peak of inflation comes later than that in the 
fiill-information staggered price-setting model. The response of output is 
amplified by the imperfection in common knowledge in period 0 , and con­
tinue to be larger than that in the full-information staggered price-setting 
model even after the precise information about the disturbances becomes 
common knowledge in period 1. The coefficient of the first-order autocorre­
lation term, A, as well as the responsiveness to the past aggregate nominal 
spendings, C\ and C2 , are not dependent on b and therefore common to the 
both models. While it takes the same periods for the responses of output 
and inflation in the both models to die away, the differences between them 
persist until then.
Sample sets of impulse responses for both models are shown in Fig­
ure 1.1. I set the parameter value on the strategic complimentarity, <j>, to 
0.15 following Woodford (2003a) and the AR(1) coefficient on the process for 
aggregate nominal spending, p, to 0.5 following Mankiw and Reis (2002). As 
for b in the baseline model, I choose the middle value, 0.5, assuming a — 1 
and gu = 1. With these parameter values, the size of the initial response of 
prices in the baseline model is about one third of that in the full-information 
staggered price-setting model. Accordingly the response of output is about 
50 percent amplified in period 0, and this rate of amplification is unchanged 
(even increased) in period 3 when the output gap shrinks to less than 30 
percent of its initial response.
The effects of changing parameter values are as follows. Proposition 1.1 
implies that the smaller 6 , the larger response of output and the smaller 
initial response of prices due to more serious imperfection in common knowl­
edge. A smaller 0, that is, a higher degree of strategic complimentarity leads 
to a larger A, that is, more persistent responses, and to a smaller C3 , tha t is, 
a more sluggish initial response of prices. A smaller p, that is, less persistent 
shock process also leads to a smaller C3 while it has no effect on A.
Another interesting comparison is the one between the amplitude of the 
initial responses in the baseline model and that in a static model of imperfect 
common knowledge without staggered price-setting. In the static model, 
averaging (1 .1 ) over i gives the average price of the whole economy as follows
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Pt =  E t pt +  <j>Et yt
— (f>Etmt + ( l -  4>)Et pt
= <f>f_
j = 1 ......................................................................................................................................
where the average expectations operator is now defined as Et{•) =  Jq El(') di. 
Substituting (1.9) and assuming m t-i  =  mt- 2  =  0 ,1 have
Pt = i - b ( i - < t , ) a € t - (L15)
The corresponding result in the baseline model is (1.13) with pt~ 1 =  m t- \  =  
m t - 2  =  m t - 3  =  et- i  = p = 0 , that is,
by/<f>( l-\-y/$) . .
Pt =  4~- f r ( '3 - 2 ^ - > r et’ (L16)
which is smaller than (1.15) unless b and 0 are too small. The difference 
between (1.15) and (1.16) is the effect of dynamic higher-order expectations 
about the future states of the economy as well as the current state, which 
causes a sluggish adjustment of prices.
1.3 Public Information
In this section I introduce a noisy public signal in addition to private signals 
into the baseline model in order to study the consequences of more general 
information structure following Hellwig (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003). 
The public signal in the extended model may represent noisy information 
provided by the media, the government, or preliminary data to be revised. 
As Morris and Shin (2002) argued, public information in an economy where 
decision-makers’ information sets are heterogeneous has a disproportionately 
large effects on their decisions.
1.3.1 Private and Public Signals
First I re-specify the firms’ information set. In period t, firm * has access 
to not only their private signals (1 .6 ) but also a public signal that is not 
necessarily precise as follows.
z f  = m t + av vt vt ~  JV(0, 1) (1-17)
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where vt is Gaussian white noise distributed independently both of e* and 
of Ut(i) for all i. Whereas Amato and Shin (2003) assume that price-setters 
never know precise information about aggregate disturbances like the Wood­
ford model, I keep the assumption that the true value of m* will be revealed 
to all firms with a delay of only one period in t + 1. Therefore the informa­
tion set of firm i consists of the private and public signals and the history 
of realized aggregate nominal spending, of which noisy information, z f ,  as 
well as precise information, {mt-s}%Li, is common knowledge. Following 
Hellwig (2002), firms’ signal extraction for estimating mt can be calculated 
as
E im t = E[mt \ zt(i),
= a  A zt (i) -I- ( 1  — a) A z f
+(1 -  A) {m t - 1  +  p {mt- 1  -  m t- 2 )} (1.18)
where
=
01 ~ a% +
represents the relative importance of the private signals to the public signal 
in firms’ signal extraction problem, which is higher when the precision of 
the private signals is higher (au is smaller) given the precision of the public 
signal, and
A  =  0-2 _  Q-2
~<r2 + $ % ~ a 2  + a a Z
represents firms’ relative reliance on the private and public signals, which is 
higher when the precision of the composite signal is higher given the variance 
of aggregate nominal spending.
As in the baseline model, I calculate the higher-order expectations about 
mt as follows.
= (a A y + 1  zt ( i ) + 1  ~  ( ° ^ + 1  ( 1  -  a ) A z f
+  { l - ( a A ) W - l ^ p ( i - a ) A }
{m t - 1  +  p (mt- i  -  m t- 2 )} (1.19)
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+1* mt =  (a A ) J + 1  rrtt +
1 — (a  A ) J + 1  . P
1 - t t A
+ { l - ( « A ) W -  1 / “ J ’ d - a l A }
{mt_x +  p (mt- i  -  m t- 2 )}...............................
=  { ( a A ^  +  l " ^ ^ 1 ( 1  -  a) a |  g<t
1  -  (qAV ' + 1  .
H ,--------7—  (1 -  “ ) A <TV Vt1 — a  A
+{m (_ 1 +  p (mt- 1 -  m t- 2 )} (1.20)
Compared with firm Vs own estimate of m* (1.18), its expectation of 
the higher-order average expectations (1.19) disproportionately overreact to 
public information including the public signal and the history of realized 
aggregate nominal spendings rather than private information. The infinite- 
order average expectation converges to the expectations conditional only on 
the common knowledge.
1.3.2 Effects o f Monetary Disturbances
Substituting (1.20) into (1.12) in the baseline model, I obtain a stable solu­
tion of the difference equation Xt =  A x t- i  +  C\ m t - 1 +  C2 m t- 2  +  C3  0  €* +  
C4  av vt where A, Ci, and C2 are the same as in the baseline model and
C3  = 2 \R > (1 + V?) (1 +  + P \/?)
C4  =
{l + V$ - p ( l - V $ ) }
a  A
4 - a A ( 3 - 2 v/? - 0 )  
8  V?  (1 "I- V?  P y/*F)
+ ( 1 - 4 )
(i  +  V ?)2J
(1 — a) A
(l +  v ^ ){ l  +  V $ - p ( l - V $ ) }  {4 - a A ( 3 - 2 V ? - 0 )}’
and A = ( 1  — A) /  ( 1  — a  A).
As before, I examine the impulse responses of output and inflation to a 
monetary disturbance, a unit positive innovation in €0 , and compare them 
with those in the baseline model as well as the full-information staggered 
price-setting model. The baseline model without the public signal corre­
sponds to the case of av = 0 0  so that a  = 1  and A =  6 , and the full- 
information staggered price-setting model corresponds to that of au — 0  
and crv =  0 0  so that a  =  1 and A =  1 . The responses of price level and
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output in this extended model are calculated as a set of equilibrium paths 
{ p f  iVt } whh 0 < a < 1 and 0 < A < 1. The analytical results of the 
comparison are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2. i) The impulse response of output in the extended 
model is persistently larger than that in the full-information staggered price- 
setting model but smaller than that in the baseline model, i.e.,
Vt > y f  > Yt, t>  0 .
ii) The impulse response of inflation in the extended model is delayed 
and then persistently larger than that in the full-information staggered price- 
setting model but smaller than that in the baseline model, i.e.,
Vt ~  Pt-i < Pt ~ Pt-i < P t ~  P t-u  * =  0,1.
Vt -  P t-1 > Pt ~  P t-1 > P t -  P t-u  t  > 2 .
Proof, i) Taking the difference between yf* and Yt, I have
-p _ yr = 4 vffi(l + + Pvffi)___________ (1 — A)g______
y° ° (1 +  V?){1 +  V ? - P ( 1 - V ? ) }  {4 — a: A (3 — 2  V ? — <£)}
t f - Y i  =  (1 +  A) (jjf -  Yq) 
y ? - Y t = A ( $ £ . ! - £ - ! ) ,  t>  2 .
These are smaller than yt — Yt in the proof of Proposition 1.1 where a = 1 
and A = (3.
ii) Taking the difference between p f  — p{ a n d  Pt — P t-u  I have
p 4 V? ( 1  +  >/? +  p y/4>)
Po -  Po = (l +  V?) {i +  V? -  p (i -  v W  
(1 - A)<r
{ 4 - a A ( 3 - 2 V ? - ^ ) }  
( p f - P o ) - ( A - A )  =  A( p ^ - Po )  
( p ? - p f ) - ( A - A )  =  - (1  -  A2) (po -  Po) 
(Pf - P f - i ) -  (A  - A - i )  =  A {(pf_ i-P tP- 2 ) - ( A - i - A - 2 )}, t > 3.
(p f — pf.l j )  — (Pt — P t-1 ) for t =  0 , 1  are larger and for t  > 2  are smaller 
than (pt — p t-i) — (Pt — P t-1 ) in the proof of Proposition 1 . 1  where a = 1
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and A =  f3. ■
The provision of the public signal allows the firms to gain common 
knowledge so that they can calculate the higher-order average expectations 
more precisely, which alleviates the sluggishness in their initial adjustment 
of prices to some extent. Compared with the full-information staggered 
price-setting model, however, the response of inflation is delayed and that 
of output is amplified as long as their information sets are heterogeneous.
Sample sets of impulse responses for the extended model are shown in 
Figure 1.2 as well as those for the two models shown in Figure 1.1. I set 
crv as well as au and a to 1  so that a = 0.5 and S = 2/3. Other parameter 
values are the same as in Figure 1.1. With these parameter values, the size 
of the initial response of prices in the extended model is about 60 percent of 
that in the full-information staggered price-setting model. Accordingly the 
response of output is about 30 percent amplified in period 0, and this rate 
of amplification is unchanged (even increased) in period 3 when the output 
gap shrinks to less than 30 percent of its initial response. The response 
of inflation is slightly delayed but peaks at the same period as in the full- 
information staggered price-setting model and earlier than in the baseline 
model.
The effects of changing parameter values are the same as in the baseline 
model. Proposition 1.2 implies that the larger a  and the smaller A, the 
larger response of output and the smaller initial response of prices due to 
the more serious imperfection in common knowledge.
The comparison of the amplitude of the initial responses in the extended 
model with that in a static model including the public signal as well as 
private signals can be made as before. The average price in the static model 
is
A ( l  — a  +  ad))
"  1  - <*A( 1  — 0) a  ^ *
The corresponding result in the extended model is
Pt =  \f4> (1 +  V4>)
“ A + ( i - a )4 — a  A (3 — 2  y/<j> — <f>) v (1 +  v W .
aet , (1 .2 2 )
which is smaller than (1.21) unless A and <j> are too small and a  is too close 
to 1 . As before, the difference between (1.21) and (1 .2 2 ) is the effect of
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dynamic higher-order expectations about the future states of the economy 
as well as the current state, which causes a sluggish adjustment of prices.
1.3.3 Effects o f Informational Disturbances
While the public signal reduces uncertainty in the firms’ higher-order average 
expectations, it brings another aggregate uncertainty as it contains noise. 
Under imperfect common knowledge, firms disproportionately overreact to 
the noisy public signal, which could destabilize the economy. I consider 
this side effect of public information, studied by Morris and Shin (2002), by 
examining the impulse responses to a disturbance in the public signal in my 
model.
The responses of price level and output to a unit positive innovation in 
vq are calculated as a set of equilibrium paths {pf ,  y f  } with 0  <  a  < 1  and 
0 < A < 1 . The responses of output and inflation axe given by
_P  ______4yffi(l +  yffi +  pyffi)___________ ( 1  -  a) A crv_____
Vo ~  +  +  ( 4 - a A ( 3 - 2 ^ - ^ ) }
y f  =  ( 1  +  A ) y f
Vt =  *V t-i, t > 2
and
4 yffi ( 1  +  yffi +  p yffi)___________ ( 1  -  a) Acrv_____
(1 +  x/0) {1 4- yf4> -  p (1 -  v W  {4 -  a  A (3 -  2 >/?-<£)}
A P f
- ( l - A 2 )p 0P 
a ( p £ - i - p p 2)> * > 3-
Firms raise their prices reacting to an upward-biased public signal. Since 
the exogenous process for aggregate nominal spending is not affected by the 
informational disturbance, the increase of prices leads to a corresponding 
decrease of output.
Improving precision of the public signal does not necessarily dampen 
the amplitude of those responses. While a small av directly leads to a small 
response of prices, it also leads to firms’ large reliance on the public signal, 
that is, small a  and large A, therefore indirectly causes high responsiveness 
to the informational disturbance. If the latter, indirect effect dominates,
Po
~p ~p
Pi  - P o
~p ~p
P2 - P i
~P ~P
Pt ~ P t - 1
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firms over-react to the public signal so much that improving precision of the 
public signal over-exposes firms to the noise and amplify the responses.
Sample sets of impulse responses of output and inflation to a negative 
informational disturbance are shown in Figure 1.3.1, where I choose the 
same parameter values as in Figure 1.2. While firms reduce their prices 
reacting to the downward-biased public signal, output increases correspond­
ingly. When the output gap starts shrinking, prices starts increasing so that 
the peak of inflation comes later than that of output. Combining this pat­
tern of responses to a negative informational disturbance with those to a 
positive monetary disturbance examined in the previous subsection makes 
the response of inflation more delayed and that of output more amplified, 
which could offset the effects of providing the public signal that alleviates 
the sluggishness in the initial adjustment of prices.
In Figure 1.3.2, I plot the initial response of prices, Pq , as a function of 
the precision of the public signal, av. While improving precision of the public 
signal in the range of high precision (small crv) dampens the amplitude of 
the response, it amplifies the response in the range of low precision (large 
<iv). This implies that the provision of a public signal could destabilize the 
economy unless it has sufficiently high precision.
1.4 General Staggered Price-Setting
The models so far are based on a simple two-period staggered price-setting. 
In this section, I consider more general price-setting environment allowing 
for multiple-period staggered price-setting. In particular, I am interested in 
the Calvo-type price-setting which is most widely used in the recent New 
Keynesian macroeconomic models.
1.4.1 Set-up
Consider an economy where a proportion 6 \ of monopolistically competitive 
firms z 6  0 i set their prices in each period, 02 of firms i G ©2 set their 
prices in every other period, 0 3  of firms z € © 3  in every three periods, and 
0 4  of firms z 6  © 4  in every four periods. Within ©j, the periods of price- 
setting are staggered among equally-sized j  groups. I assume the maximum 
fixed-price length is four periods so that Y^j= 1 Oj = 1 .
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While the static optimal price-setting condition in the baseline model 
(1 .1 ) is unchanged, the individual price equation (1 .2 ) is modified as follows.
xt (i) =  <
P t ( i )  for i 6  0 i
5 W (0 + $  p!+i (0) for *e  0 2 ,t
5  (pf ( 0  +  ^ t P t + l W  +  ^ P t + 2 (0 )  f o r  * e  ° 3 ,t
k \  (pf (*) +  E tP t+ S)  +  ^?Pf+2 (*) +  ^?Pf+3(0) for i e  0 4,t
where is 1  / j  of the firms within ©j who set their prices in period t. 
Averaging over those firms i E ©i U ©2 U ©3 ^  U ©4 >t, I have
Xt — Ld\P* +  U>2 E t  P*+ 1 +  Us E t Pt+2 +  ^ 4  E f  P*+ 3 
where
(1.23)
Pt  = E t p t  +  <pEt y t
and
^ 1  =  #i +  2  ^ 2  +  j  03 +  j  04
^ 2  =  r  0 2  +  o 03 +  7  042 3 4
us =  g +  4
=  -  04 .
4
The average expectations operator Et is now defined as the average of El 
over z € © 1  U ©2 ,t U ©3 ,* U ©4jt.
The overall price index is given by the weighted sum of prices set in the 
current and past periods as in the baseline model. (1.3) is now rewritten as
pt =  Ui Xt +  u  2 x t- 1 +  us Xt-2  +  u 4 x t - s . (1.24)
The demand side of the economy, specified by (1.4) and (1.5), is the 
same as in the baseline model. The information structure is the same as in 
Section 1.3 where the public as well as private signals is incorporated.
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1.4.2 Impulse responses
As before, I examine the impulse responses of output and inflation to a 
monetary disturbance, and compare them with those in the corresponding 
full-information staggered price-setting model.
Since the analytical results corresponding to Proposition 1.2 in Sec­
tion 1.3 are qualitatively little changed, I provide them in Appendix. Here I 
examine sample sets of impulse responses shown in Figure 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6. 
In Figure 1.4, in order to analogize the model with the Calvo-type price- 
setting, I set 0j to 0.5, 0.25, 0.15, and 0.1 for j  = 1 to 4 respectively, which 
implies the constant probability with which each firm gets the opportunity 
to change its price is approximated by oj\ =  0.7. Other parameter values 
are the same as in the extended model in Section 1.3.
As in the two-period staggered price-setting models in the preceding 
sections, the size of the initial response of prices in the case with only pri­
vate signals is about one third of that in the corresponding full-information 
staggered price-setting model, while that in the case with both public and 
private signals is about 60 percent. Accordingly the initial response of out­
put is more than 80 percent amplified in the case with only private signals, 
while that is about 50 percent amplified in the case with both public and 
private signals. Whereas the above rates of amplification are larger than 
those in the two-period staggered price-setting models in period 0 , they 
monotonically decrease as the output gap shrinks. However, the response 
of output continues to be amplified, that is, persistently larger than that in 
the corresponding full-information staggered price-setting model.
One of the main problems in the Calvo-type price-setting model I men­
tioned in the introduction is that the price level jumps in the period of 
disturbance and inflation responds earlier than output gap. The above re­
sults show that this problem can be overcome by incorporating imperfect 
common knowledge into the model. It amplifies the initial response of out­
put and delays the response of inflation by making the initial adjustment of 
prices more sluggish.
Meanwhile, the Woodford model of imperfect common knowledge has a 
problem that the response of output to a monetary disturbance is relatively 
weak compared with the Calvo-type price-setting model. The above results 
show that this problem can also be overcome by integrating imperfect com­
mon knowledge and staggered price-setting. The response of output in my
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integrated model is unambiguously amplified by imperfection in common 
knowledge.
In Figure 1.5, I set 0j to 0 for j  = 1 to 3 and 6 4  = 1 , that is, only 
four-period staggered price-setting with other parameter values unchanged. 
The size of the initial response of prices in the case with only private signals 
is about 40 percent of that in the corresponding full-information staggered 
price-setting model, while that in the case with both public and private 
signals is more than 60 percent. Following that, the responses of inflation in 
both cases are slightly delayed but they peak at the same period as in the full- 
information staggered price-setting model. The initial responses of output 
are relatively large but the rate of amplification is just about 15 percent in 
the case with only private signals and about 9 percent in the case with both 
public and private signals. Those amplification rates are unchanged (even 
increased) as the output gap shrinks. Since the share of the prices chosen in 
the period of disturbance under imperfect common knowledge, wi, is smaller 
than that in the previous Calvo-analogized case, the responses are closer to 
those in the corresponding full-information staggered price-setting model.
Lastly, to complete the discussion, I examine the responses to an informa­
tional disturbance. Sample sets of impulse responses of output and inflation 
to a negative informational disturbance for both the Calvo-analogized case 
and the four-period staggered price-setting case are shown in Figure 1.6. 
While the amplitude of the responses is larger in the former case, the per­
sistence is larger and the peak comes later in the latter case.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I propose a model that integrates the Woodford (2003a) 
imperfect common knowledge model with the Taylor-Calvo staggered price- 
setting model in order to explain plausibly the observed effects of monetary 
policy. I drop the Woodford’s unrealistic assumption that all price-setters 
never know the widely available data on the aggregate demand nor even 
the actual quantity they sold at their own price, and instead assume that 
the true state of the economy is revealed to all price-setters with a delay of 
one period. With staggered price-setting, however, the model can generate 
persistent real effects of monetary policy. The average prices chosen in each 
period depends on the higher-order expectations about not only the current
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state of the economy but also the future states during the periods the prices 
will be fixed, which makes the initial adjustment of prices to a monetary 
disturbance more sluggish than that in both the static imperfect common 
knowledge model and the full-information staggered price-setting model. 
The response of inflation is delayed following the sluggish initial response 
and the response of output continues to be amplified.
The above results are robust in the models in Section 1.3 where a noisy 
public signal in addition to private signals is introduced and in Section 1.4 
where the staggered price-setting environment is generalized. While the 
provision of the public signal alleviates the sluggishness in the initial ad­
justment of prices to monetary disturbances, it exposes firms to additional 
disturbances, namely informational noise, and could destabilize the econ­
omy. The Calvo-analogized model in Section 1.4 overcomes the problem in 
the full-information Calvo model that the price level jumps in the period of 
disturbance and inflation responds earlier than output, and also overcomes 
the problem in the Woodford model that the response of output is relatively 
weak compared with the full-informaiton Calvo model.
Although the models in this chapter are too simple for practical uses such 
as policy and empirical research, it does not seem too difficult to develop a 
more realistic and richer dynamic general equilibrium model based on them. 
Policy implications derived from the extended model can be concerned with 
the central bank’s communication strategy such as commitments and trans­
parency, which corresponds to the precision of the public signal in the model, 
as well as optimally stabilizing monetary policy rules. As for empirical impli­
cations, the effects of information structure such as the relative importance 
of public information to private information on the characteristics of the 
monetary policy effects such as the persistence of inflation could be esti­
mated. Although there have already been a few recent attempts to develop 
richer dynamic general equilibrium models to address those issues7, most of 
them assume unrealistically too much unawareness or inattentiveness like 
the Woodford model. The models in this chapter assume more realistic in-
7Amato and Shin (2003) consider a targeting rule expressed in terms of the price level, 
the output gap, and the natural rate of interest, while Adam (2004) studies optimal mon­
etary policy. Hellwig (2002, 2004) studies the welfare costs of heterogeneous information 
and the role of monetary policy in the model where precise information will be eventually 
revealed as in my models. Kawamoto (2004) examines the role of monetary policy in the 
model with imperfect common knowledge about technology shocks.
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formation sets of economic agents, and also have tractability and flexibility. 
I hope they serve as an alternative building block for future research in 
various directions.
A ppendix
Solution of the General Staggered Price-Setting Model
The key equations of the model are (1.23) and (1.24).
x t = wi pf 4- U2  Et P* + 1  +  ^ 3  E t p* + 2  +  ^ 4  E t P*+ 3
P t =  V l  X t  +  a>2 X t - 1 +  U>3 X t - 2  +  w 4 X t - 3
Combining these, I have
x t =  4> (M i E t m t  +  M2 m t - 1)
+  ( 1 - 0 )  (Wi  Xt-3  +  V+2 # t -2  +  W 3 Xt- i
- \ -W  E t  X t +  W 3 E t  X t+ 1 +  W 2 E t  x t+ 2  +  W \ E t  xt-\-3)
where
Mi =  a>i +  u>2 (1 +  p) +  ^ 3  (1 ~l~ P"^ " P^) d- ^4 (1 H- P^)
M2 =  —{ (p +  p2) +  a;4  (p +  /o2  +  p3) }
Wl =  6^1 UJ4
1 + 2  =  C t > i  O J3  +  6 J 2  ^4
1 + 3  =  Cc?i £J2  +  k>2 ^3 "I" ^3 ^ 4
1 +  =  U ) \  +  C t> 2  +  ^ 3  +
Suppose that all firms believe that the solution form of the above difference 
equation for Xt is
Xt  =  A i X t - l  +  A2 X t - 2 +  A3 X t - 3
+ C i  TTlt—l +  C2 m t—2 +  C3 (J €t +  C4 «JV Vt.
As before, I identify the undetermined coefficients as follows.
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Cs = M a A  , .. 1
1 — a  A W* ( ~  ’ 1 - W
C4 =  M* ( 1 _ a ) A
(1 —  a  A W * )  (1  -  W * )  
where 4  =  ( l - A ) / ( l - a A )  and
M* =  +  W 3  C i  +  W 2 C 2  +  (IV2 X i +  W 1 A2 ) Ci +  W i  Aj C 2
+ W i  Af C i  +  ( W 2 Ci +  W i  C 2 +  W -i Ai C i  +  W i  C i) (1 +  p )  +  W i  C i  p  }
W *  =  ( 1 - 0 ) { W '  +  W3 Ai +  W'2A2 +  W'iA3
+ ( W 2 A! +  W 2 A2 ) A! +  W i  Ai A2 +  W i  A ? } ,
while Ai, A2 , A3 , Ci, and C2  are determined independently of a  and A by 
solving the following difference equation
”  W l L ~ 3 ”  W 2  L ~ 2  - W 3 L - 1 -  W  - W 3 L - W 2 L 2  -  W i  L3^  xt
— ^  (Mi +  M 2 L) mt,
1  - 4>
where L  is the lag operator defined as L x t  =  x t - 1 .
Now I compare the responses of price level (or inflation) and output to 
a unit positive disturbance in eo, calculated as a set of equilibrium paths 
{ P t  ,V t } wi** 0  < a < 1 and 0 < A < 1 , with those in the case of only 
private signals, {pt , y t }  with a = 1 and 0 <  A < 1, and those in the case of 
full homogenous information, {P t,Y t}  with a  =  1  and A =  1 .
The difference in the initial response of prices is given by
P p  (j}\ M* (1 — A) <7
Po -  Po =  —
( 1  — o: A W*) (1 — W*) ’
which is negative unless the sign of ( 1  — a  AW*) is different from that of 
( 1  — W*). Correspondingly, the difference in the initial response of output 
is given by
P * u\ M* (1 — A) cr 
Vo ~  *o = ( 1 - a  AW*) (1 - W * ) ’
which is positive on the same condition. The absolute values of the above 
differences are increasing in a, which implies that > po and < yo, 
that is, the provision of the public signal dampens the initial responses.
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The difference in the response of output evolves as follows.
y f  -  Yt = Xi (y f-i -  Vi-i) +  a 2  (yf_ 2  -  Yt- i)  + M  (yf- 3  -  Yt- 3) 
+ — ( v g ~ % ) ,  0 <  t < 3.Ml
= M ( y f - i - t i - x ) + M ( v f - 2 - Y t- 2 ) + >*{yf-3 - Y t - s ) ,  t>  4,
which implies that the response of output continues to be amplified as long 
as positive roots Ai, A2, and A3 are chosen.
Meanwhile, the difference in the response of inflation, between =
Pt  — pt- 1 and I l t  = P t -  P t- 1 ? evolves as follows.
n f  - f i t  = a , -  n t_ i) +  A2 (ftf-2 -  n«-2) +  A3 { if-3  -  n t—3)
u  1
=  Ai (w f -  n3) +  A2 «  -  n2) +  A3 (rrf -  flj)
i p f - P o ) ,  t = 4.U1
=  A1 « 1 - n t_I) + A 2 ( C 2 - n 1_ 2 ) +  A3 ( < 3 - n t-3), t >  5,
which implies that the sign of the difference in period 0  will be reversed 
later, that is, the response of inflation is delayed after the initial sluggish 
adjustment of prices.
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Figure 1.1: Baseline Model
Figure 1.1.1: R e sp o n se s  of O UTPUT to a positive m onetary d isturbance
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Figure 1.2: Extended Model (M onetary D isturbance)
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Figure 1.3: Extended Model (Informational D isturbance)
Figure 1.3.1: R e sp o n se s  to a NEGATIVE informational disturbance
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Figure 1.4: C alvo-type p rice-se ttin g
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Figure 1.5: Four-period staggered  p rice-settin g
Figure 1.5.1: R e sp o n se s  of OUTPUT to a positive m onetary disturbance
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Figure 1.5.2: R e sp o n se s  of INFLATION to a positive m onetary disturbance
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Figure 1.6: General staggered  p rice-settin g  (Informational Disturbance)
R e sp o n se s  to a NEGATIVE informational disturbance  
Figure 1.6.1: C alvo-type price-setting
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Chapter 2 
Inventories in the M onetary 
Transmission Mechanism
This chapter studies the role of inventories in the monetary transmission 
mechanism by developing simple dynamic general equilibrium models which 
assume pre-determined prices. Inventories serve as a source of real rigidi­
ties, that is, amplify the persistence of the real effects of monetary policy. I  
consider a production-smoothing motive and a sales-facilitating motive for 
holding inventories. Inventories respond procyclically and prices are ad­
justed gradually to a nominal disturbance only i f  the sales-facilitating motive 
is relatively strong enough; otherwise inventories respond countercyclically 
and prices are adjusted excessively. I  also consider the case where produc­
tion as well as prices is pre-determined, in which inventories absorb shocks 
unintendedly as long as production cannot be adjusted. I f  the decision lag of 
price-setting is longer than that of production, inventories respond counter­
cyclically at first and then move procyclically, which is consistent with the 
pattern shown in empirical studies.
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2.1 Introduction
There are many mechanisms that co-operate in transmitting monetary shocks 
to the economy. This paper studies the role of inventories in the monetary 
transmission mechanism by developing simple dynamic general equilibrium 
models.
Changes in inventories are key components in business cycles so that 
economists closely look at inventory data when they assess the current state 
of business cycles. Although the share of inventory investment in GDP is less 
than one percent, reduction in inventories arithmetically account for about 
half of the fall in GDP during post-war U.S. recessions (Ramey and West, 
1999). Nonetheless most of existing monetary business cycle models pay no 
attention to inventories. For example, the standard dynamic New Keynesian 
models based on the staggered price setting assume that even in the periods 
monopolistic suppliers cannot set their optimal price they have to produce 
whatever quantity to meet the demand, that is, the quantity buyers may 
wish to purchase at their fixed price. If goods are storable, however, those 
suppliers may wish to hold inventories in order to smooth production or 
facilitate sales. Gradual adjustments of the stock of inventories could make 
the monetary policy effects on production or sales more persistent. This 
idea was proposed by Blinder and Fischer (1981) in their IS-LM framework, 
but has not been considered in optimization-based monetary business cycle 
models until very recently.
Probably one of the main reasons for the neglect of inventories is simply 
that we do not have a conventional dynamic general equilibrium model with 
inventories that can successfully explain stylized facts. According to Khan 
and Thomas (2004), a core set of empirical regularities in post-war U.S. data 
that “any useful model of inventories should seek to address” is as follows: 1 ) 
the relative variability of inventory investment is large; 2 ) the correlation be­
tween inventory investment and GDP is positive; 3) the correlation between 
inventory investment and final sales is positive; 4) the standard deviation of 
production exceeds that of sales1; 5) the correlation between inventory-to- 
sales ratio and GDP is negative. In addition, Wen (2002) pointed out that 
inventory investment is procyclical only at relatively low cyclical ffequen-
1Given the accounting identity that GDP is equal to final sales plus inventory invest­
ment, it is sufficient for the fact 3) to imply the fact 4).
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cies such as the business-cycle frequencies; it is countercyclical at very high 
frequencies (2-3 quarters per cycle).
It is not easy for the most popular inventory theory, the production 
smoothing theory, to explain the stylized fact that inventory investment is 
positively correlated with sales and accordingly production is more volatile 
than sales. The production smoothing theory simply claims that firms hold 
inventories in order to smooth production if their short-term production 
function is concave. It is proved that this theory can be reconciled with 
the fact of relatively volatile production if demand shocks are highly serially 
correlated or cost shocks rather than demand shocks are dominant in the 
economy. It is not clear, however, whether the production smoothing model 
can generate volatile production in response to monetary shocks.
Some other theories emphasize sales-related motives for holding invento­
ries2. The stock avoidance theory claims that firms hold inventories in order 
to avoid losses of opportunity for sales when they cannot adjust production 
to meet positive demand shocks. Bils and Kahn (2000) more emphasizes the 
relationship between sales and inventories, and assume that sales directly 
depend on the available inventory stock, i.e., the sum of current production 
and inventory stock in the beginning of period. They claim that a larger 
stock of inventories facilitates matching with potential purchasers who ar­
rives with preferences for a specific type of good when the stock is considered 
as an aggregate of similar goods of different sizes, colours, locations, etc. The 
relationship between sales and inventories is taken into account by many em­
pirical studies in which a class of the “linear-quadratic models” (Ramey and 
West, 1999) is typically specified.
One of the main challenges in this chapter is to introduce inventories into 
a monetary dynamic general equilibrium model in a way that is consistent 
with the above stylized facts on inventories. Monopolistic suppliers in my 
models have both the production-smoothing and sales-facilitating motives 
for holding inventories. The production-smoothing motive is incorporated
2Other theories on inventories also include the factor-of-production theory and the 
(S,s) theory. The former, mainly adopted in the real business cycle models including 
Kydland and Prescott (1982), claims that inventory stock at each stage of production 
may facilitate shipment, delivery, distribution, and eventually final production and should 
be treated as a factor of production. The latter, recently incorporated into a dynamic 
general equilibrium model by Khan and Thomas (2003), emphasize the role of inventories 
that saves fixed costs of production or ordering and construct a model that features the 
S-s type of decision rule for inventory investment.
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by assuming that the marginal disutility of production is increasing. The 
sales-facilitating motive is incorporated by introducing a generic cost of sales 
that can be saved by holding inventories. This motive induces farmers to 
keep a close relationship between sales and inventories. If the generic cost 
function of sales and inventories is constant return to scale, the optimal 
inventory-to-sales ratio can be explicitly derived. Since the motive for keep­
ing the relationship between sales and inventories causes the fluctuations 
in sales to amplify those in production, the sales-facilitating motive can 
be interpreted as a kind of the “accelerator motive” in the literature3. In 
my baseline model which assumes just one-period pre-determined prices, 
I will show that inventory investment responds procyclically to a nominal 
disturbance only if the sales-facilitating motive is relatively strong enough. 
Moreover, in an extended model which assumes production as well as prices 
is pre-determined, inventories initially absorb the shock unintendedly so that 
inventory investment responds countercyclically at first and then move pro­
cyclically, which is consistent with the cyclical pattern pointed out by Wen 
(2002) and the estimated VAR evidence by Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
Another challenge is to explain how prices are adjusted to monetary 
shocks. The models in this chapter assume nominal rigidities such that 
prices must be determined in advance or based on old information. The 
price-setting decisions of the monopolistic suppliers are closely related with 
their inventory-holding decisions. I will show that prices are adjusted gradu­
ally to a nominal disturbance, which is consistent with many VAR evidences 
including Bernanke and Gertler (1995), only if the sales-facilitating motive 
for holding inventories is relatively strong enough and inventory investment 
moves procyclically at business-cycle frequencies; otherwise prices are ad­
justed quickly and even excessively at the early stage of the adjustment.
The intuition behind the above inventory-holding and price-setting be­
haviour is as follows. Suppose that a positive nominal disturbance occurs in 
the economy, which means monopolistic suppliers face an unexpected boom 
in sales because they cannot adjust their prices immediately in the period 
of disturbance. If the sales-facilitating motive for holding inventories is relar 
tively strong compared with the production-smoothing motive, the suppliers
3In more than sixty years ago, Metzler (1941) proposed a mechanism called “inventory 
accelerator” in which a desired level of inventory stock and its relationship with sales plays 
a crucial role. He also considered “unintended inventories” I will consider below.
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initially produce more than the amount just to meet the demand so that 
they can hold inventory stock above its normal level to keep the relationship 
between sales and inventories. Then they start adjusting prices gradually 
so that sales and inventories can gradually go back to their original levels 
with keeping their relationship. If the production-smoothing motive is rela­
tively strong, on the other hand, the suppliers meet the initial unexpected 
demand partially by reducing their existing inventory stock because they 
strongly wish to avoid changing production so much. Then they raise prices 
aggressively, even excessively, to dampen sales so that the reduced inventory 
stock can gradually recover in parallel with production gradually going back 
to its original level4.
By incorporating inventories into a monetary business cycle model in 
an appropriate way, the persistence of monetary policy effects is amplified 
as Blinder and Fischer (1981) argued. I will show that even my baseline 
inventory model which assumes that all prices must be determined just one 
period in advance, or equivalently that true information about disturbances 
is revealed to all price setters just one period later, can generate the real ef­
fects of monetary policy lasting several periods. In an extended model which 
assumes longer-period pre-determined prices, the real effects persist even af­
ter all prices start being adjusted, which implies the model with inventories 
need not to assume some fraction of prices determined on the basis of unre- 
alistically very old information as the sticky information model of Mankiw 
and Reis (2002) does for generating persistent real effects. Inventories serve 
as a source of “real rigidities” (Ball and Romer, 1990), that is, amplify the 
effects of nominal rigidities.
I will show most of the above results analytically in my sufficiently sim­
plified models where monopolistic “yeoman farmers” produce and directly 
supply their individual-specific goods and consume all types of those differ­
4Another explanation for the relationship between the inventory-holding and price- 
setting behaviour, interpreting the inventory stock as an asset whose return is decreasing, 
is as follows. The opportunity cost for monopolistic suppliers to deviate inventory stock 
upwards from its normal level is equal to the expected deflation rate of their own products 
if the nominal interest rate is fixed. Thus they set higher prices for the next period 
than the current period (prices must be pre-determined) when they hold inventory stock 
above its normal level, which implies gradual increases of prices in response to a positive 
nominal disturbance (the case of strong sales-facilitating motive). On the other hand, 
they set lower prices for the next period when they hold inventory stock below its normal 
level, which implies gradual decreases after an excessive increase of prices (the case of 
weak sales-facilitating motive). See footnote 14 in the baseline model below.
51
entiated goods. I examine the effects of nominal disturbances by restricting 
my attention to stationary fluctuations around the steady state and log- 
linearizing equilibrium conditions. I extend my models step by step from 
the baseline model which assumes just one-period pre-determined prices to 
the models which assume both production and prices are pre-determined 
and the length of the decision lag for price-setting is heterogeneous among 
farmers. Finally, I develop a more realistic model that includes labour mar­
ket, capital accumulation, explicit money, and real disturbances and assess 
quantitatively the cyclical pattern and persistence of aggregate variables. 
Although not all the results of my simulations quantitatively match with 
the data, they qualitatively well capture the stylized facts on inventories 
and support my analytical results.
Recent studies such as Hornstein and Sarte (2001) and Boileau and Le- 
tendre (2004) deal with similar problems to this chapter. One of the main 
differences between their models and mine is the assumption of nominal 
rigidities. While Hornstein and Sarte assume staggered price-setting a la 
Taylor (1980)5 and Boileau and Letendre assume costly price adjustment a 
la Rotemberg (1982) and Ireland (2001)6, the models in this chapter assume 
pre-determined prices a la Fischer (1977) that is a prototype of the sticky in­
formation model. The motivations for the assumption are as follows. First, 
it makes the models so simple that I can easily obtain analytical results. 
Secondly, the pre-determined prices models cannot generate persistent real 
effects of monetary policy without inventories, which encourages me to ex­
amine how the persistence is generated by introducing inventories into the 
models. Thirdly, I will consider unintended inventories caused by a decision 
lag of production. It seems reasonable to assume pre-determined prices to­
gether with pre-determined production for examining unintended inventories 
in response to nominal disturbances. In addition, the pre-determined prices 
or imperfect information models have the following advantages over the more 
popular staggered price-setting models. As Mankiw and Reis (2002) ar-
5Homstein and Sarte (2001) consider inventories held for only the production- 
smoothing motive and show that an aggregation effect intrinsic to price-staggering can 
make aggregate inventories conform to the stylized facts. Chang, Hornstein and Sarte 
(2004) use their staggered price-setting model with inventories for studying the response 
of firms’ employment to productivity shocks.
6Boileau and Letendre (2004) consider inventories held for alternative motives and 
compare how those models are consistent with stylized facts and can generate persistent 
output and inflation through quantitative experiments.
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gued, imperfect information models can explain the delay of price adjust­
ment better than staggered price-setting models. Moreover, I will show that 
the responses of disaggregate inventories to a nominal disturbance in the 
pre-determined prices models seem more plausible than those in the stag­
gered price-setting models of Hornstein and Sarte (2001) where the level of 
disaggregate inventory stock oscillates as price-setters change their prices 
alternately.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2,
I describe the baseline model and show the main results on the effects of 
nominal disturbances. In Section 2.3, I extend the baseline model by as­
suming that production as well as prices are pre-determined. I seek to find 
a condition under which a model assuming pre-determined production can 
explain more precisely the observed cyclical pattern of inventory-holding 
behaviour that includes unintended inventories. I also consider the case of 
heterogeneity in the length of the decision lag for price-setting among farm­
ers. In Section 2 .4 ,1 develop a more realistic quantitative model and report 
the main results of simulations. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Baseline M odel
In this section I develop a basic dynamic general equilibrium model simpli­
fied enough to obtain analytical results on the properties of the effects of 
nominal disturbances on aggregate variables including inventories.
The baseline model in this section assumes a minimum nominal rigid­
ity: all prices must be determined one period in advance due to imper­
fect information or some other constraints. I will consider the cases of 
longer-period pre-determined prices, the pre-determination in different pe­
riods among price-setters, and pre-determined production as well as prices 
in the next section. The models in this and next sections neglect some basic 
and realistic factors in the economy such as labour market, capital accumu­
lation, explicit money, and real disturbances which I will introduce in the 
quantitative model in Section 2.4.
2.2.1 Set-up
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived “yeoman 
farmers” indexed by i € [0 , 1 ] who produce and directly supply their individual-
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specific goods and consume all types of those differentiated goods. Farmer i 
who supplies a good of type i seeks to maximize a discounted sum of utilities 
of the form
(2.1)
where 0 < (3 < 1 is a discount factor, CJ is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution 
aggregator of farmer Vs consumption of each individual good of type j
(2.2)
with 9 >  1, and yt{i) is Vs production. I assume rj is strictly positive so 
that the marginal disutility of producing good is increasing and accordingly 
farmers have incentives to smooth production. The larger rj, the stronger 
production-smoothing motive.
Products are storable in this economy. Sales and production need not 
match in each period since the gap is adjusted by inventories. The resource 
constraint for good i is
stock of good i. xt(i)) is a generic function of sales cost that can
be saved by holding inventories, which captures the role of inventories to 
facilitate sales. By virtue of this benefit in addition to the role for smoothing 
production, farmers hold inventories despite no explicit returns and some 
physical storage costs which are included in the generic function. I assume 
that $  is a non-negative increasing function of ct(i) and a decreasing function 
of xt{i) and the second derivatives satisfy 4>cc > 0 , <&Xx > 0  and <&cx < 
0 for relevant region. The absolute value of <J>cx represents the degree of 
the sales-facilitating motive for holding inventories: the larger |$cx|j the 
stronger sales-facilitating motive. This motive induces farmers to keep a 
close relationship between sales and inventories.
Financial markets are complete in this economy. Even if the income 
streams from sales are expected to differ among farmers, they can choose an 
identical consumption plan under the intertemporal budget constraint for
yt (i) -  $(ct (i), x t (i)) =  Ct(i) +  x t (i) -  xt-i{ i), (2.3)
where ct(i) = / q c((i)dj is the sales and xt(i) is the end-of-period inventory
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any farmer i from any period t,
§ « - [ f Ps(j)c’s(j)dj < Wt + f 2 EtQ t,A P s(i)c ,(i)i (2.4)a=t
where Qt, 3 is a stochastic discount factor, Wt is the beginning-of-period 
wealth, and p t ( i )  is the price of good i .  Farmers allocate their consumption 
across differentiated goods at each period so as to maximize the index (2 .2 ), 
taking as given the level of total expenditure P t ( j ) c t ( j ) d j , which implies
4(J) = $ Q ,  (2.5)
where
■ U ‘P t=  I I P t t i ) 1 9d j
i
1= 0
is the corresponding price index with which z’s optimally allocated total 
expenditure is equal to PtC\. Taking as given this optimal allocation of 
consumption at each period, farmers then choose optimal path of total con­
sumption. The first order condition at t is given by
^ r  = /3(l + it) Pt (2 .6 )
^ t  -C'U-rt+l '-'t+l J
where it is the riskless nominal interest rate which corresponds to (l-Mt) - 1  =  
EtQt,t+1 - Here I drop the superscript of C* and use Ct = / q C\di instead 
since all farmers choose the same consumption plan.
At the same time in each period, farmers make a decision on their pro­
duction and inventory investment. Since they are monopolistic suppliers who 
set their prices under demand constraint in sales, their decisions on produc­
tion are partly combined with those on prices which I will describe in the 
next paragraph. Meanwhile, farmers can control their inventory investment 
independently of their price-setting decisions7. The first-order condition for 
optimal inventory-holding is given by
y t{ i f  {1 +  $x(c«(z), xt (i)) } = pE tyt+ iii ) 11. (2.7)
rThe first-order condition for optimal inventory-holding (2.7) is unchanged even if 
farmers are price-taker. This does not mean, however, there is no connection between 
inventory-holding and price-setting behaviours in this model.
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They hold inventories so that the marginal cost of increasing inventories in 
terms of the marginal disutility of production in the current period should 
be equal to the expected marginal benefit from reducing production in the 
next period, which includes both the production-smoothing and the sales- 
facilitating motives. This is a key equation in the model.
Farmers choose their prices one period in advance. Using the information 
set available only in period t —1 , farmer i sets its price pt(i) so as to maximize 
(2.1) subject to (2.3), (2.4), and the demand constraint ct (i) =  Ct
which comes from (2.5) with dropping the superscripts. The first-order 
condition is given by
P t{ i )  "Et-i
P t
6 +  (2-8)0 - 1
Factors in the expectation operator in the right hand side represent the 
real marginal cost of supplying good i ,  which consist of the marginal cost 
of sales in terms of the marginal disutility of production divided by the 
marginal utility of consumption.
Lastly, I introduce an exogenous stochastic process for aggregate nominal 
spending as follows.
In M t  = In M t - i  + e t , (2.9)
where M t  =  P t  C t  and e t  is white noise. One may interpret M t  as “money” 
that farmers must hold for their spending and the above process may be 
taken as a monetary policy rule specified by a target path for the money 
supply. Alternatively, one can image a fiscal-monetary policy rule specified 
by a target path for the aggregate nominal spending which may be achieved 
by adjusting the nominal interest rate on the government bond8. This simple 
specification for aggregate demand, however interpreted it is, allows me to 
concentrate on examining the consequences of alternative specifications for 
aggregate supply such as inventory-holding and price-setting behaviours. In 
my analysis in this and next sections, I suppose that the disturbance driving 
the above process for aggregate nominal spending is a monetary policy shock.
8Under the optimal consumption rule of the private sector (2.6), that policy is imple­
mented simply by holding the nominal interest rate on i  =  / ? _ 1  — 1 .
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2.2.2 Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, every farmer sets the same price and therefore 
purchases the same amount of each differentiated good, which implies for 
any i
Pt{i) = Pt 
ct(i) =  Ct.
Then equations (2.3), (2.7), and (2.8) are rewritten as
Vt -  $(Ct , X t ) =  Ct + X t - X t - x  (2.10)
y(” { 1 +  $ x(Ct, X t) } =  /3 EtY?+ 1  (2.11)
1 =  - ^ E t - t l C t Y f i l  + ^C u X t) } ]  (2.12)
where Yt = yt (i)di and X t = x t(i)di.
A rational-expectations equilibrium of the economy is defined as a set 
of {Ct, I t ,  X t, Pt, i t}  which satisfies the resource constraint (2 .1 0 ) and the 
decision rules for consumption (2 .6 ), inventory-holding (2 .1 1 ), and price- 
setting (2 .1 2 ), given the exogenous process for aggregate nominal spending 
(2.9) where M t = Pt Ct .
In what follows, I restrict my attention to stationary fluctuations around 
the steady state. The deterministic steady-state conditions for (2.10), (2.6),
(2 .1 1 ), and (2 .1 2 ) are as follows.
Y  — $(C, X ) = C  (2.13)
1 =  /?(l +  t) (2.14)
1 + $ x(C ,X )  =  (3 (2.15)
1  =  l  +  * c(C ,X )}  (2.16)
Around the steady state, 3>(C*, X t), $ c(Ct, X t), and $ x(Ct, Xt) may be 
approximated as follows.
$(Ct , X t) “  $ (C ,X )  + $ c ( C t- C )  + $ x ( X t - X )  
$ c{Ct, X t) = $ c  +  $ c c  (Ct — C) + $ c x  (Xt — X )
$x(Ct, X t) = +  $ c x  (Ct -  C) +  $ x x  (X t -  X )
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where $ c  =  * c(<?, X ), $ x  = *«(C, X ), $ Cc  =  $cc(C, X), $ Cx  = 
$cx(C, X ), and <&xx =  &xx(C, X ). Using these and the above steady- 
state conditions, the whole system consisting of log-linear approximations 
to the equilibrium conditions can be obtained as follows.
Ct = EtCt+i - { i t - ( P t +i - P t ) }  (2.17)
■ n %  = r , E t Y t + i  -  C t  -  X t  (2.18)
o =  Et-1 O- I ( i  I C * c c \  ri  , X $ c x  ^
, j Y t  +  { 1 +  T ^ ) C t  +  T T ^ X t
(2.19)
Y t =  p ( l  + $ c )C t + y ( P X t - X t- 1) (2.20)
M t = Pt + Ct (2 .21)
M  = M t - i  +  e, (2.22)
where Ad* =  In A4*, Pt =  InP*, z* =  ln(l -I- zz)/(l +  z), and other variables
with hat denote log-differences (or rate of deviation) from their steady-state 
values such as X t =  In{Xt/X ) .
If the function 4>(Ct, Xt) is constant returns to scale, the above sys­
tem can be simplified. I introduce the function <j>(Zt) =  $(1, X t/C t) = 
$(Ct, X t)/Ct where Zt = X t/Ct is the inventory-to-sales ratio. The as­
sumptions about the function $  imply 4>\Zt) <  0 and <f>"(Zt) >  0. Here 
<f>"(Zt) rather than |4>cx| represents the degree of the sales-facilitating mo­
tive. First, the deterministic steady-state conditions (2.13), (2.15), and 
(2.16) are rewritten as follows.
Y  = C { l  + <}){Z)} (2.23)
1 + <f>'(Z) = (3 (2.24)
1 =  +  (2.25)
The optimal steady-state inventory-sales ratio Z  is given by (2.24). Around 
the steady state, the degree of the sales-facilitating motive, <f>u(Z), corre­
sponds to the marginal cost of deviating inventory-to-sales ratio from its 
optimal level Z. Then the equations (2.18), (2.19), and (2.20) in the above 
log-linearized system are rewritten as follows.
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rjYt = r,EtYl+1 -  Z ^ Z) (Xt -  Ct) (2.26)
0 =  Et-1 Y  , p ______ Z 2  <j>"(Z) * *vY t + Ch x +  ^  _  z  (X t Ct) (2.27)
In the numerical examples below and the quantitative model in Section 2.4,
I assume the function $  is constant returns to scale for simplicity; otherwise 
I seek to obtain analytical results without specifying 3>.
2.2.3 Effects o f Nominal Disturbances
Using the above log-linearized model, I examine the effects of nominal dis­
turbances on real aggregate variables such as consumption, production, and 
inventories as well as on prices. The exogenous process for aggregate nomi­
nal spending (2.9) implies that a unit positive innovation in et raises EtMt+k
by one for all k > 0. The disturbance I consider below is such an unexpected
permanent increase of one unit in the log of aggregate nominal spending.
Suppose that the economy originally stays at its steady state with M t- \  = 
Pt- 1  =  0, and then in period t the disturbance, et =  1, occurs. Since I
assume that prices axe pre-determined, the initial responses of prices and
consumption axe
Pt = 0  
C t =  1.
The rational-expectations equilibrium I am interested in is one in which 
deviations of real variables from their steady-state values are stationary, 
which requires
lim EtPt+k =  1
fc—► oo
lim EtCt+k -  0 .
fc—►oo
Also, EtYt+k and EtXt+k must converge to 0 as k —> oo. In order to obtain 
such a unique stationary equilibrium, I assume the following conditions on 
the parameter and the steady-state values.
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> 0 ; < 0 ; $ c c  > 0 ; $ x x  > 0 ; $ c x  < 0 ;
$* =  $ x x  { Y (1 +  $C +  C $ c c )  +  n C ( \  +  $ c )2}
+ ( l - / 3 ) r i C ( l  +  $ c ) il > c x - C Y $ 2C x  > 0 .  (2.29)
I seek to find a set of sequences { E t C t + k ,  E t Y t + k ,  E t X t + k ,  E t P t + k ,  E t i t + k  } 
which satisfies the log-linearized model and is consistent with the above ini­
tial and terminal conditions assuming (2.29). The solution is given in the 
following proposition.
P ro position  2 .1 . Suppose that the economy around the steady state is 
approximated by the model (2.17) through (2.21) and the aggregate nominal 
spending evolves according to (2.22). All variables with hat are zero in period 
t — 1. Prices are determined one period in advance. Then the responses of 
inventories and consumption to a unit positive innovation in e* are given by
E t X t + k  —  A E t X t + k - i  
E t C t + k  == I1 E t X t + k - i
for k >  1, where 0 < A < 1 is the smaller of the two real roots of the 
characteristic polynomial
(3 a  A2 — { ( 1  + (3) a  — —} A + a  =  0
® c x
where 3>* is defined in (2.29) and
_ f C  (1 4 - $ c )  1 + $C + C  $CC 1 /, > X. \  ^  n0 =  1 — ^ ------------------------- — j q ( i  +  <M > 0 ,
and
_  ( l - / 3 \ ) i 1 X ( l  +  $ c ) - \ X Y $ C x  
> i ~  Y ( \  +  <s>c +  c $ c c )  +  n C ( i  +  $ c ) 2
while for k = 0
A  =  ___________________________________ c  (1  +  $ p )  { - $ c x  -  V 0  (1  +  * c ) / Y } _____________________________________
4 (X  $ x x  +  r ilP X /Y )  (1 +  $ c )  + H 0 ( 1  +  +  C $ c c )  +  \ 0 X $ Cx
Ct = 1 .
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The responses of production, prices, and nominal interest rate are given by
EtYt+k =  y  (1 +  * c )  EtCt+k +  y  ((3EtX t+k — EtX t+k-1)
EtPt+k =  1 —  EtCt+k
Eth+k = 0
for k > 0.
The proof is given in Appendix.
Here I assume $ x x + $ x c  > 0 for simplicity9. Then the main properties 
of the inventory-holding and price-setting behaviours are summarized by the 
following corollaries.
C orollary  2.1.1. i) Inventories respond procyclically, i.e., X t > 0 and 
EtXt+k > 0 for k >  1, if —$ c x  >  77/3 ( 1  +  $ c ) / Y . ii) Inventories respond 
countercyclically, i.e., X t <  0  and EtX t+k < 0 for k > 1 , if  — $ c x  < 
r)/3(l + $ c ) /Y .  Hi) Inventories do not respond, i.e., EtX t+k =  0  for k >  0 , 
i f  —$ c x  — V P ( 1  +  * c ) / Y .
Corollary 2.1.2. i) Prices are expected to be adjusted gradually, i.e., 
EtPt+i < 1 andEtPt+k < I fork >2, if - $ c x  > r i/3 (l+ § c )/Y . Prices 
are expected to be adjusted excessively, i.e., EtPt+i > 1 and EtPt+k > 1 for 
k >2, if —$ cx  < ?7 / 3  (1 + $ c ) /Y . Hi) Prices are expected to be adjusted 
instantaneously, i.e., EtPt+k =  1 for k > 1, if —$ c x  = 7 7 /3  (1 +  $ c ) /Y .
The deviation from the steady-state level of inventory stock is expected 
to decay monotonically from its initial response in period t, whether it is 
positive or negative. The sign of the initial response depends on the differ­
ence between — $ cx  and 77/3 ( 1  +  $ c ) /Y ,  or the coefficient of Ct in (2.18), 
—C $cx/P , and 77 (l +  $cO C/Y,  as stated in Corollary 2.1.110. Since |$ c x | 
represents the degree of the sales-facilitating motive for holding inventories 
and 77 represents that of the production-smoothing motive, a positive or pro­
cyclical response of inventories occurs when the sales-facilitating motive is
9  This assumption implies C  >  X  if the function $  is constant returns to scale. With­
out this assumption, Corollary 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 should be modified as follows: inventories 
respond procyclically and prices are expected to be adjusted gradually if - $ c x  > *7/3 ( 1  +  
$ c ) / Y  but also (X  $ x x  +  T7/32  X / Y )  (1 +  &c) +  P P (1 +  +  C  $ c c )  +  \ ( 3 X  $ c x  >  0.
10If the function $  is constant returns to scale, this condition depends on the difference 
between Z  4>"(Z)/p and 77 {1  +  -  Z  <j>\Z) } C / Y .
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relatively strong while a negative or countercyclical response occurs when 
the production-smoothing motive is relatively strong11. If neither motive 
dominates, i.e., — <&cx = 77 (1 -h $ c ) /Y ,  inventory stock never deviates 
from its steady-state level.
The inventory dynamics affect dynamic behaviours of other variables 
such as consumption, production, and prices. After the adjustment of prices 
starts in period t+ 1 , the deviations from the steady-state values of consump­
tion and production are expected to decay monotonically, in parallel to that 
of inventories. This means that the real effects of the nominal disturbance 
persist even after all farmers get precise information about the disturbance 
and start adjusting their prices. It takes the same periods for the adjust­
ment of prices to be completed as for the real variables including inventory 
stock to go back to their original levels. If inventories do not respond in the 
period of disturbance12, however, prices will be adjusted instantaneously 
and the real effects will disappear in the next period, as in the standard 
pre-determined prices or imperfect information models without inventories.
The sign of the initial response of inventories determines how consump­
tion and production are expected to respond and how prices are expected 
to be adjusted to the disturbance, as stated in Corollary 2.1.2. A sample set 
of impulse responses of those variables for the case of relatively strong sales- 
facilitating motive is shown in Figure 2.1.113. Faced with an unexpected 
boom in sales in period £, farmers produce more than the amount just to 
meet the demand so that they can hold inventory stock above its normal 
level for the strong sales-facilitating motive. After period t  +  1, they will 
adjust their prices gradually so that sales and inventories can gradually go 
back to their original levels with keeping their close relationship. Meanwhile, 
production is sharply reduced from t to t +  1  because they have relatively
11In my analytical results, I define the procyclical response of inventories as the deviation 
of inventory stock upwards from its steady-state level in response to a positive nominal 
disturbance. In the case of procyclical response of inventories, as I will mention later, 
inventory investment  also moves procyclically, that is, its movement is positively correlated 
with that of production.
12This could occur in my model not only when —$ c x  — t?/3 (1 -f $ c ) / Y  but also 
when the cost of deviating inventory stock from its steady-state level is prohibitively high: 
$ x x  =  00 .
13In Figure 2.1.1, I assume the function $  is constant returns to scale and 77 =  1.5, 
(3 =  0.99, 0 =  10, C / Y  =  0.99, Z  =  X / C  =  2/3, and 0"(Z) =  5 (which implies 
—C $ c x / ( 3  =  X $ x x / 0  =  Z<t>"(Z)/l3 =  3.367) are chosen for illustrative parameter 
values. In Figure 2.1.2, <j>"(Z) =  1 (which implies Z  <t>"(Z)/f3 =  0.6734) is chosen with 
other parameter values unchanged.
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little concern about smoothing production. This movement of production 
is correlated with that of changes in inventory stock, which means inven­
tory investment also moves procyclically. Another sample set for the case 
of relatively weak sales-facilitating motive is shown in Figure 2.1.2. In this 
case, since farmers strongly wish to avoid changing production so much, 
they meet the unexpected demand in period t  partially by reducing their 
existing inventory stock, with relatively little concern about the relationship 
between sales and inventories. Then in period t  +  1 , they raise prices ag­
gressively, even excessively, to dampen sales so that the reduced inventory 
stock can gradually recover in parallel with production gradually going back 
to its original level14.
Comparing these two cases, I find that the case of the strong sales- 
facilitating motive is more plausible: it is consistent with the stylized fact 
on inventories that inventory investment is procyclical or production is more 
volatile than sales, and also consistent with many empirical evidences in 
the literature that prices are adjusted gradually to nominal disturbances. 
In other words, assuming a strong sales-facilitating motive is needed for 
obtaining plausible impulse responses to a nominal disturbance in a simple 
dynamic general equilibrium model with inventories.
2.3 Unintended Inventories
The baseline model in the previous section assumes that farmers must deter­
mine their prices one period in advance while they can control their produc­
tion without any decision lags. In this section I consider the case in which 
production as well as prices must be pre-determined. If production as well 
as prices cannot be adjusted to unexpected demand within a period, inven­
tories are forced to absorb the shock unintendedly, which implies inventories 
move in the opposite direction to sales at least until production becomes ad-
14Equations (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19) imply E t - i [ i t  — (A + i — A )] =  E t - i [ — ^ C  —
X  ~ (&+i “  &) ~ (-&+1 “  **) I* The left hand side “  the
opportunity cost of increasing inventories (deviating inventory stock upwards from its 
steady-state level) and the right hand side is marginal benefit (marginal reduction in the 
sales cost) from holding inventories both directly through the optimal inventory-holding 
decision and indirectly through the optimal price-setting decision. Since it =  0 for all t, 
this equation implies that farmers set higher prices for the next period than the current 
period when they hold inventory stock above its steady-state level, as stated in footnote 4 
in the introduction.
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justable. Business economists pay much attention to those countercyclical 
movements in “unintended inventories” when they try to detect a turning 
point of business cycles. Indeed, as Wen (2002) pointed out, inventory in­
vestment in the data moves countercyclically at very high frequencies while 
it moves procyclically at business cycle frequencies. The estimated VAR ev­
idence of the response of inventory investment to a monetary policy shock in 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) also implies those cyclical movements. I seek to 
find a condition under which a model assuming pre-determined production 
can explain such a pattern of inventory-holding behaviour.
2.3.1 Identical Lags in Production and Price-setting
First I consider the simplest case in which both production and prices are 
determined one period in advance, so that the decision lags are identical. In 
this case, I only have to modify the information set in the inventory-holding 
decision of the baseline model. The first-order condition (2.7) is replaced 
with
E t-i[yt{i)v {1 + ®x(ct (i), x t (i) ) }] =  (3E t-iy t+ iii ) 11 •
The corresponding log-linearized equation
V E t - i Y i  = n E t - i Y t + i  -  E t - i C t  -  E t ^ X t  (2.30)
replaces (2.18).
Then I examine the effects of a nominal disturbance as before. The 
results are summarized as follows.
P roposition  2 .2 . Suppose that the economy around the steady state is 
approximated by the model (2.17), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21), and (2.30), and 
the aggregate nominal spending evolves according to (2.22). All variables 
with hat are zero in period t — 1. Both production and prices are determined 
one period in advance. Then the responses of inventories and consumption 
to a unit positive innovation in et are given by
EtXt+k = A EtXt+k-i 
EtCt+k = H EtXt+k-i
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where A and p are given in Proposition 2.1. For k =  0,
C ( l  +  $ c )
(3X
1.
The responses of production, prices, and nominal interest rate are given by 
the same equations in Proposition 2.1.
C orollary  2 .2 .1 . Inventories respond countercyclically, i.e., X t < 0 
and E tX t+k < 0  for k > l .
C orollary  2 .2 .2 . Prices are expected to be adjusted excessively, i.e., 
EtPt+1 > 1 and EtPt+k > 1  for k >2 .
The proof of Proposition 2.2 is given in Appendix.
The above corollaries imply that the sales-facilitating motive, however 
strong it is, does not work as in the baseline model. Farmers who care about 
the relationship between sales and inventories are expected to raise their 
prices aggressively in period t + 1  in order to dampen sales because inventory 
stock has reduced unintendedly in period t. Even if farmers have no sales- 
facilitating motive, they need to dampen sales for the reduced inventory 
stock to recover gradually without a large adjustment of production. As a 
result, the response of inventories is countercyclical and the adjustment of 
prices is excessive for any parameter values within the ranges I assumed.
2.3.2 Different Lags in Production and Price-setting
Since the case of identical decision lags in production and price-setting 
turned out to be implausible, I consider next the cases of different deci­
sion lags. There are two possibilities: a longer decision lag is needed for 
production than for price-setting, or the opposite. First I consider the for­
mer. Leaving the assumption of price-setting in the baseline model still un­
changed, I assume production must be determined two periods in advance. 
Then the only log-linearized equation I have to modify is again (2.30), which 
is replaced with
n E t^ Y t = v E t - i f t + 1  -  E t- id t  -  E t-2X t (2.31)
for k > 1 ,
X t = 
C t =
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The effects of a nominal disturbance are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that the economy around the steady state is 
approximated by the model (2.17), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21), and (2.31), and 
the aggregate nominal spending evolves according to (2.22). All variables 
with hat are zero in period t — 1. Production is determined two periods 
in advance, while prices are determined one period in advance. Then the
responses of inventories and consumption to a unit positive innovation in et
are given by
E t X t + k  =  A  E t X t + k - i
EtCt+k — ^E tX t+ k-i
for k > 2 ,  where A  and p  are given in Proposition 2.1. For k = 1,
E  _  ________ C  (1 +  $ c )  (1 +  +  C  $ c c ) _________ 0
‘ t+1 0 X { C ( l  +  $ c ) * c x - P ( l  +  $ c  +  C $ c c ) }
C  ( 1  +  S c) ^ c x  
1 t+ 1  P  { C  (1 +  S c )  S e x  — f t  (1 +  S c  +  C  S e c ) }
For k =  0,
*  _  C ( l  + S c )
~  J x
C t =  1.
The responses of production, prices, and nominal interest rate are given by 
the same equations in Proposition 2.1.
Corollary 2.3.1. Inventories respond countercyclically, i.e., X t < 0, 
EtXt+i < 0 , and EtXt+k < 0  for k > 2 .
Corollary 2.3.2. Prices are expected to be adjusted excessively, i.e., 
EtPt+ 1  > 1  and E tPt+k > l f o r k > 2 .
The proof of Proposition 2.3 is given in Appendix.
As in the case of identical decision lags, farmers are expected to raise 
their prices aggressively in period t +  1  regardless of their sales-facilitating 
motive. Again, the response of inventories is countercyclical and the ad­
justment of prices is excessive for any parameter values within the ranges I 
assumed.
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Therefore, the only remaining possibility of procyclical inventories and 
gradual price adjustments explained by a model assuming pre-determined 
production is in the case where a longer decision lag is needed for price- 
setting than for production. I now assume prices must be determined two 
periods in advance while production must be determined one period in ad­
vance. (2.19) in the baseline log-linearized model is replaced with
0 =  Et- 2
0
| i 1 . C $ c c  \  A . X  $CX  V-
’?y‘ + ( 1 + r ^ j c < + T T ^ X t
(2.32)
while (2.18) is replaced with (2.30) rather than (2.31). The effects of a 
nominal disturbance are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the economy around the steady state is 
approximated by the model (2.17), (2.20), (2.21), (2.30) and (2.32), and the 
aggregate nominal spending evolves according to (2.22). All variables with 
hat are zero in period t —1. Prices are determined two periods in advance, 
while production is determined one period in advance. Then the responses 
of inventories and consumption to a unit positive innovation in et are given 
by
EtXt+k =  A EtXt+k- 1
EtCt+k — EtXt+k-1
for k > 2, where A and p are given in Proposition 2.1. For k = 1,
E j t  = ___________ c (1 + { - $ c x  -  T} (1 + (3) (1 + $ c ) / Y } __________
* t+1 ( X  $ x x  +  r)P2 X J Y ) (1 + $c) + p(3 (1 + +  C $ c c )  + A / 3 X $ Cx
EtCt+i =  1.
For k = 0,
C(1 +  $ c )
(3X 
Ct = 1.
The responses of production, prices, and nominal interest rate are given by 
the same equations in Proposition 2.1.
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C orollary  2.4.1. i) Inventories respond countercyclically at first, i.e., 
X t < 0 , and then are expected to move procyclically, i.e., E tX t + 1 > 0  and 
EtXt+k > 0 for k > 2, if  —$ c x  > »/(l +  /?) (1 +  $ c ) /Y .  H) Inventories 
respond countercyclically, i.e., X t < 0 , EtXt+i < 0 , and EtXt+k <  0  for k > 
2 , if  —& cx < Tj (1+/?) ( l+ $ c ) /Y .  Hi) Inventories respond countercyclically 
at first, i.e., X t <  0 , and then are expected to return to their original steady- 
state level instantaneously, i.e., EtXt+k =  0  for k > I, if  —<&cx =  7 7 ( 1  +  
0 ) ( l  + * c ) /Y .
C orollary  2.4.2. i) Prices are expected to be adjusted gradually, i.e., 
EtPt+i < 1 and E tPt+k < 1  fo rk  > 2 , if  — > V (1 +  0) (1 +  $ c ) /Y .  ii) 
Prices are expected to be adjusted excessively, i.e., EtPt+i > 1 and EtPt+k > 
1 for k > 2 , if  —& cx < *7(1 +  /?)(! +  & c)/Y . Hi) Prices are expected 
to be adjusted instantaneously, i.e., EtPt+k — 1  f or k > 1 , if  —$ c x  =  
77(i +  ^ ) ( i  +  $ c ) /y .
The proof of Proposition 2.4 is given in Appendix.
In this case, prices still cannot be adjusted in period t +  1 and the boom 
in sales continues from t to t+ 1 . Farmers then try to recover the reduced in­
ventory stock by adjusting production rather than prices, which implies that 
the growth of production in t +  1 is fully explained by the change in inven­
tory investment. If the sales-facilitating motive is relatively strong compared 
with the production-smoothing motive, i.e., — $ c x  >!7(1 +  /?)(1 +  $ c ) / Y  i 
as shown in Figure 2.2.115, farmers will increase production so much that 
inventory stock will exceed the original level and make it close to the strong 
sales in period t +  1. After period t +  2, they will raise their prices gradually 
so that sales and inventories can gradually go back to their original levels 
with keeping their close relationship. If the sales-facilitating motive is rela­
tively weak, i.e., —$ c x  <  77 (1 + /3) (1 +  $ c ) /Y ,  as shown in Figure 2.2.2, 
they will not increase production so much, because of their relatively strong 
production-smoothing motive, and accordingly the inventory stock in period 
t +  1 will be still below its original level. Then in period t +  2, they need to 
dampen sales by raising prices aggressively for the inventory stock to recover 
gradually without a large adjustment of production.
15In Figure 2.2.1, <j>"(Z) =  10 (which implies - C $ c x / P  =  X $ x x / P  =  Z<l>"(Z)/p =  
6.734), and in Figure 2.2.2, <f>"(Z) =  1 (which implies 4>"(Z)/ft =  0.6734) are chosen 
for illustrative parameter values with other parameters unchanged from Figure 2.1.1 and 
2.1.2.
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Here I find that inventories respond procyclically and prices are adjusted 
gradually to a nominal disturbance in the case of a longer decision lag for 
price-setting than for production if the sales-facilitating motive is relatively 
strong enough, although it needs to be stronger than that in the case of 
no decision lag for production in the baseline model. Whether I consider 
pre-determined production or not, I need to assume a longer decision lag for 
price-setting than for production for obtaining the procyclical response of 
inventories and the gradual adjustment of prices. Moreover, the case con­
sidering pre-determined production captures more precisely the observed 
pattern of inventory-holding behaviour that inventory investment moves 
countercyclically at very high frequencies and procyclically at business cycle 
frequencies.
Is it reasonable to assume that the decision lag for price-setting is longer 
than that for production? One possibility is that there exist some fac­
tors that directly cause a substantial decision lag for price-setting such as 
long-term contracts or commitments. Another possibility is that informa­
tion processing, or “information stickiness” advocated by Mankiw and Reis 
(2002), for price-setting is different from that for production. In the case 
considering pre-determined production, unintended inventories in the period 
of disturbances have some information about the shocks. When farmers look 
at their unintended inventories, they may recognize the shocks and use the 
information in some ways for their decision of production or price-setting in 
the subsequent periods. The information in unintended inventories might 
be more quickly processed for the decision of production than that of price- 
setting, which could cause a longer decision lag for price-setting.
2.3.3 Heterogeneity in price-setting
In the end of this section, I provide a more realistic example for the case 
of a longer decision lag for price-setting than for production which includes 
heterogeneity in the length of the decision lag for price-setting among farm­
ers. I assume there are four groups of farmers in the economy. A quarter 
of farmers have to set their prices one period in advance, another quarter 
of farmers have to set their prices two periods in advance, another quarter 
three periods in advance, and the other quarter four periods in advance. 
Meanwhile, all farmers have to determine their production one period in 
advance. The equilibrium is no longer symmetric, which means each group
69
of farmers set different prices and accordingly sales, inventories, and produc­
tion all vary between the groups. The model consists of many equations for 
each group’s decisions, from which I do not seek to derive analytical results 
as in the case of symmetric equilibrium.
A sample set of impulse responses of aggregate variables to a nominal 
disturbance is shown in Figure 2.3.1. I choose exactly the same parame­
ter values as in Figure 2.1.1 where the sales-facilitating motive is relatively 
strong enough. The real effects persist even after all farmers start adjusting 
their prices, which implies this model need not to assume some fraction of 
farmers who set their prices on the basis of unrealistically very old infor­
mation as the Mankiw and Reis (2002) sticky information model does for 
generating persistent effects. The response of production is hump-shaped, 
which peaks immediately when it becomes adjustable in period <4-1. The 
response of inflation peaks later than that of production as in the sticky 
information model. On the whole, the results well capture main features of 
the monetary policy effects reported in, for example, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995).
The responses of disaggregate variables are shown in Figure 2.3.2. The 
four dotted lines in each panel represent the responses of the four groups 
while the solid line represents the aggregate or average response. The overall 
price is adjusted gradually as the four groups of farmers start adjusting their 
prices one after the other from t  -I- 1 to 1 4- 4. Sales for goods produced by 
the farmers who start adjusting their prices earlier decline, while the farmers 
who cannot adjust their prices face strong demand due to their relatively 
low prices. Inventories of the farmers who start adjusting their prices earlier 
respond countercyclically while inventories of those who cannot adjust their 
prices respond procyclically after production becomes adjustable in t 4 * 1 . 
Those patterns for disaggregate variables are totally different from those 
in the staggered price-setting model with inventories which is reported in 
Hornstein and Sarte (2001). In their model the level of disaggregate inven­
tory stock oscillates as price-setters change their prices alternately, which 
seems unrealistic.
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2.4 Q uantitative Experiments
The models so far omit various factors for analytical simplicity. In this sec­
tion I develop a more realistic model that includes labour market, capital 
accumulation, explicit money, and real disturbances and assess quantitar 
tively the cyclical pattern and persistence of aggregate variables.
Following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattern (2000, hereafter CKM) and Boileau 
and Letendre (2004, hereafter BL), I consider a monetary economy in which 
a large number of identical and infinity-lived agents consume a homoge-
goods indexed by i 6  [0, 1]. The representative consumer seeks to maximize 
a discounted sum of utilities of the form
Pt {Ct +  It) +  Mt -f Qt,t+iBt+i = Pt (wt Nt +  rt K t- 1 ) 4- M t-i + B t+ T t + H-t
Mt is nominal money balances, Nt is hours worked, wt is the real wage rate, 
rt is the rental rate of capital, Tt is nominal net transfers from the govern-
firms described below.
Following BL, I assume there are producing and retailing firms owned 
by consumers. The competitive retailing firms purchase all types of inter­
mediate goods St(i) from the producing firms i € [0, 1], aggregate them, and 
sell them to the consumers. They seek to maximize profits
2.4.1 Model
nous consumption-capital good produced from a continuum of intermediate
(1 -  u)(M t/P t) V j  ( 1  -  N t f
t= 0
subject to the flow budget constraint
where the capital stock they hold evolves according to
ment, and IIt is the aggregate of profits from the producing and retailing
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subject to the aggregation technology
St = \ J
e
0 - 1
where St is the aggregate sales to consumers for their Consumption and cap­
ital investment. The first order condition of their demand for intermediate 
good i is given by
(2-33)
The monopolistic producing firm i produces differential intermediate 
good i and sets a price of their own products. Products are storable. They 
seek to maximize a discounted sum of profits
Y Et Qt,s [pt(i) 8 t (i) -  Pt {Wt n t (i) + rt kt(i)}]
s=t
subject to the production technology
yt {i) =  i4t wt-.i(t)a fct_i(*)1_a,
where At is the aggregate total factor productivity, the resource constraint 
for intermediate good i
yt (i) -  $ (st {i), x t (i)) = st (i) +  x t (i) -  x t- i ( i )
where $(•) is the same function of sales cost as in the baseline model, and the 
demand constraint (2.33). The above production technology implies that the 
producing firms have to determine their inputs for production one period in 
advance although the productivity shock may change their planned output. 
Also as in the section 2.3.3, I assume that a quarter of the producing firms 
have to set their prices one period in advance, another quarter two periods 
in advance, another quarter three periods in advance, and the other quarter 
four periods in advance.
Clearing conditions for the final goods, labour, and capital markets are
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Lastly, the exogenous shock processes for the productivity and money 
growth are given by
In A t = (1 -  pA)ln A  + p A lnA t- i  + e f  
In (M t/M t-j) = ( l - / * ) l n ( A M )  +  / ' l n ( M t_ i/M t_2) +  e f
where A  is the mean level of the productivity and ln(AM) is the mean 
growth rate of money, eA and are white noise processes distributed 
independently of each other and normally with variances (aA)2 and (<rM)2 
respectively. The government is assumed to provide nominal transfers to 
the consumers in each period so that Tt = Mt — M t- 1 -
2.4.2 Results
I log-linearize the model around the steady state as I did the baseline model, 
set all parameter and steady-state values, and compute average sample mo­
ments such as standard deviations, autocorrelations, and cross correlations 
over 200 simulations of 200 quarters (50 years).
I choose several parameter values following CKM: a = 0.67, x  = 0.39, 
and 6  = 10. 'ip is chosen so that the steady-state share of hours worked is 
0.333. v is chosen so that the standard deviation of investment relative to 
that of production, which is computed from the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered 
simulated data, is 3.25. The steady-state values of capital stock and invest­
ment are chosen so that the annualized capital-output ratio is 2.65 and the 
investment-output ratio is 0.23 in the steady state.
Some other values are chosen following BL: (3 =  0.99, 5 =  0.025, and 
o =  1.5. For exogenous shock processes16, A = 1, pA = 0.979, oA =  0.0072, 
A M  = l , p M = 0.69, and oM =  0.006.
I set S / Y  =  0.99 which implies the share of inventory investment in 
GDP is one percent. The quarterly inventory-to-sales ratio is set to Z  =
16BL choose the parameter values on the process of productivity following King and 
Rebelo (1999) and the process of money growth by estimation using the post-war U.S. 
quarterly data on M2.
X / S  =  2/3. These values are roughly consistent with the U.S. historical 
data. Meanwhile, I assume that u  is so close to  1 that the effects of real 
money balances on the marginal utility of consumption and labour supply 
are negligible17.
As for the parameters on the sales-cost function, I consider both the 
cases of constant returns to scale (CRS) and the non-CRS cases. For the 
CRS cases, I consider a case of relatively strong sales-facilitating motive, 
4 >"{Z) =  5 as in Figure 2.1.1, which implies S* =  —S  $ s x /P  =  3.367 and 
X* = X $ x x / P  =  3.367, and a case of relatively weak sales-facilitating 
motive, </>"{Z) =  1 as in Figure 2.1.2, which implies S* = X* =  0.6734. For 
the non-CRS cases, I consider the cases where X*  is 100 times larger than 
S* with S* unchanged from the above CRS cases, which implies (5*, X*) = 
(3.367, 336.7) and (S *, X*) = (0.6734, 67.34). These extremely high values 
of X*  or <&xx represent prohibitively high costs of deviating inventory stock 
from its steady-state level. To sum up, I consider four models varying in the 
values for S* and X*: (3.367, 3.367), (0.6734, 0.6734), (3.367, 336.7), and 
(0.6734, 67.34).
Results are summarized in Table 2.1. First, compared with the models 
of prohibitively high inventory-deviating costs (3.367, 336.7) and (0.6734, 
67.34), the models of reasonable costs (3.367, 3.367) and (0.6734, 0.6734) 
generate higher autocorrelations of production and inflation, which implies 
introducing inventories allows us to reproduce persistent business-cycle fluc­
tuations. Secondly, within the models of reasonable inventory-deviating 
costs, comparing the model of a large sales-facilitating motive (3.367, 3.367) 
and that of a small sales-facilitating motive (0.6734, 0.6734), we can see that 
the cross correlation between inventory investment and production, that 
is, the procyclicality of inventory investment is stronger in the large sales- 
facilitating model, as predicted by my analytical results in the preceding 
sections. The relative volatility of sales to production is accordingly smaller 
in the large sales-facilitating model. As for the first-order autocorrelations, 
the large sales-facilitating model generates more persistent inflation due to 
gradual adjustments of prices in response to money-growth shocks, while the 
small sales-facilitating model generates more persistent production due to 
relatively large production-smoothing motive. In the small sales-facilitating 
model, the autocorrelation of inflation is negative mainly due to the exces­
17CKM and BL set u  to 0.94.
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sive adjustments of prices. Meanwhile, within the models of prohibitively 
high inventory-deviating costs, there are little differences between the model 
(3.367, 336.7) and the model (0.6734, 67.34), especially in the procyclicality 
of inventory investment.
The first row of Table 2.1 shows the corresponding sample moments 
in the post-war U.S. data reported in BL. The relative volatility of sales 
to production and the cross correlation between inventory investment and 
production in the data are between those in the models (3.367, 3.367) and 
(0.6734, 0.6734). Meanwhile, the autocorrelations of both production and 
inflation in the simulated data are far smaller than those in the data.
Table 2.1 also shows the results from one of alternative inventory models 
of BL. The cross correlation between inventory investment and production is 
barely positive (0.07), which is the largest value obtained from their models. 
Meanwhile, they succeed in reproducing high autocorrelations of production 
and inflation.
Although not all the results of my simulation quantitatively match with 
the data, they qualitatively well capture the stylized facts on inventories18 
and support my analytical results in the preceding sections.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have studied the role of inventories in the monetary trans­
mission mechanism by developing simple dynamic general equilibrium mod­
els. Introducing inventories allows us to generate real effects of monetary 
policy lasting several periods even in the baseline model which assumes 
just one-period pro-determined prices, which implies inventories serve as a 
source of real rigidities. I consider a production-smoothing motive and a 
sales-facilitating motive for holding inventories. In the baseline model in 
Section 2.2, I obtain analytical results that inventories respond procycli- 
cally and prices are adjusted gradually to a nominal disturbance only if the 
sales-facilitating motive is relatively strong enough; otherwise inventories 
respond countercyclical^ and prices are adjusted excessively. In the ex­
18The simulation results also imply that the relative variability of inventory investment is 
large (0.69 in the model of (3.367, 3.367)) compared with the share of inventory investment 
in GDP (0.01) and the cross correlation between inventory-to-sales ratio and production 
is negative (-0.14), which are both consistent with the stylized facts pointed out by Khan 
and Thomas (2004).
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tended models in Section 2.3 which assume production as well as prices is 
pre-determined, inventories respond countercyclically at first and then move 
procyclically only if the sales-facilitating motive is relatively strong enough 
and the decision lag of price-setting is longer than that of production. In 
the further extended model iii Section 2.4 which introduces labour market, 
capital accumulation, explicit money, and real disturbances, I obtain quan­
titative results through simulations that support my analytical results in the 
preceding sections and are consistent with stylized facts on inventories.
Based on the models developed in this chapter, two directions for future 
research can be pursued. One is policy research. We may have to consider 
a monetary policy rule that stabilizes both production and sales as well 
as prices in the models with inventories. Another direction is empirical 
research. Inventory data have been used for identifying various types of 
shocks in the economy19, and could also provide richer evidences on the 
monetary transmission mechanism. I hope the models in this chapter serve 
as a useful building block for future research in those directions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
(2.19) in the log-linearized model implies
iPi> _  X $ c x  p  ^  ( l  +  $ c  +  C $ c c ) r / ,  , 00/4N
EtYt+k ~  " , ( i  +  * 0 ) EtXt+k--------u ( i  +  * c )—  t t+k ( )
for k > 1. Substituting this into (2.18) and (2.20), I have
p  v    @ ^ C X  p  v
E t X t + k  ~  “ (1 +  * c ) * x x - / 3 * c x E t X t + k + 1
f t C  $ c c  +  (@ — C  $ c x )  (1 +  $ c )  F  a  
(1 +  * c ) * x x - 0 * c x  1 t + k
( 3 C $ c c  + /?(1 + $ c )  n  f i  
(1 +  * c ) * x x - p $ c x  1 t + M
(2.35)
19West (1990) estimates the relative importance of cost and demand shocks as a source 
of fluctuations in GNP using U.S. inventory data.
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ip a  _  ( 3 n X ( i  +  a> c) +  X Y $ c x  „  *
* t+fe r ( l  + $c + C ^ c ) + ^ ( l  + $c)2 * t+k
, ____________r ) X ( l  +  $ c ) _____________p  y  ( o  Qa \
+y(l + $c + C$cc)+i7<?(l + $c)2 ‘ ( ' ’
for k >  1. Combining these, I obtain the following second-order difference 
equation for Xk = EtXt+k-
A(L)Xk + 1 =  0 ,
where
A(L) =  a l?  — {(1 + j3 )a — - ^ — } L  + ()at
® c x
f C (  1 + $c) 1 + + C  $CC  1 / 1  . \ n
°  =   > 0 ,
and L  is the lag operator defined as LXk  =  X k - 1 - A(L) can be factored as 
A(L) = ( 1 - X 1 L ) { 1 - X 2 L) 
where Ai and A2 are the two roots of the characteristic polynomial
.4(A) =  0 a  A2  - { ( 1 +  /? )« * - -? ! -}  A +  a  =  0.
® c x
On the assumption (2.29), I have two real roots satisfying 0 < Ai < 1 < A2  
because .4(0) > 0, .4.(1) < 0, and .4(A) > 0 for large enough A. To be 
consistent with the terminal condition lim^oo Xk = 0 , the smaller root 
must be taken in the solution form
X k = \ X k - u  (2.37)
so that A =  Ai. Using this, I can rewrite (2.36) as
EtCt+k = pE tX t+ k-i (2.38)
where
_  ( l - ( 3 \ ) V X { l  +  $ c ) - * X Y $ c x  
'1 ~  y(l + $c + C$cc) + >7C(l + $c)2'
77
For k = 0 , (2 .2 0 ) with the initial conditions Ct — 1 and X t- i  = 0  implies
•Cr ^  f t  T- \ X  *Yt = y  (1 +  $ c)  +  - y -  X t .
Substituting this and (2.34) for k =  1 into (2.18), I have
a Q X  -A
X t  =  ~ { X * x x  +  V P 2 X / Y )  (1 +  $ c ) E t X t + l
 P ( 1  + $C + c  $ c c )  p A
(X9x x +r)pX/Y)(l  + 9c) * 1+1 
c { - a o x -»? /?(i +  $ c ) / r }
( X  $ x x  +  v P 2 X / Y )  '
Substituting (2.37) and (2.38) into this, I obtain
*  = _____________C ( 1  +  <EC) { - $ c x  - V 0 ( 1  + 9 c ) /Y ) ____________ , ,
‘ (X  9 XX +«? P2  x /  Y )  ( 1  +  $ c ) +  ^  P ( 1  +  9 C +  C  $ c c ) +  A p  X  9 C£  ' '
The full sequence of EtYt+k for fc >  0 can be obtained by substituting 
(2.37), (2.38), (2.39) and Ct = 1 into (2.20).
E tYt+k = y  (1 +  9 C) EtCt+k +  y  (J3EtX t+k -  E tX t+k. j)
Finally, since I consider a disturbance that causes E fX it+k =  1  for all 
k > 0, (2.17) and (2.21) implies
EtPt+k = 1 ~ EtCt+k (2.40)
Etit+k = 0
for all k >  0 .
Proof of Proposition 2.2
The solutions for k > 1 are the same as Proposition 2.1.
For k = 0, since production as well as prices are pre-determined, Yt = 0,
Pt = 0, and Ct = 1. Substituting these initial conditions into (2.20), I obtain
*  _  C ( l  +  * c )
*4 ~ J x ~ -
Proof of Proposition 2.3
The solutions for k > 2 and k = 0 are the same as Proposition 2.2.
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For k =  1, production still cannot be adjusted, i.e., EtYt+i = 0, while 
prices become adjustable in t  +  1. Then (2.19) implies
0 =  —X  $ c x  EtXt+i — (1 +  $ c  +  C $ c c )  EtCt+i (2-41)
Meanwhile, substituting the solution for X t into (2.20), I have
0  =  C  ( 1  +  § c ) E tCt + 1  +  (3 X E tX t+i + C  ( 1  +  $c)//? . (2.42)
Combining (2.41) and (2.42), I obtain
C  ( 1  4 -  $ c )  (1 +  +  C  $ c c )EtXt+i =
/? X  { C  (1 4- $ c ) ® cx — (3 (1 +  &c +  C $ c c ) } 
C (H -  $ c ) $ c x
E tC t+ 1  0{C(l + $o)®cx-/?(l + *c + C4oc)}'
P ro o f  of P roposition  2.4
The solutions for k > 2 and k  =  0 axe the same as Proposition 2.2.
For k =  1 , prices still cannot be adjusted, therefore, EtCt+i =  1, while 
prices become adjustable in t +  1. Substituting this condition and the solu­
tion for Xt into (2.20), I have
EtYt + 1 =  i ± £  £  (l +  $ c ) +  ^  EtXt+L
Substituting this and (2.34) for k = 2 into (2.30), I have
pi Y _________ _____________________*^C X__________________________ pi -y-
t+1 ~  ( X  <S>XX +  r , p X / Y ) ( l  +  $ c ) EtX t+2
P ( l  +  $ c  +  C $ c c )  p a
( X  $ x x + v P X / Y ) ( l  +  $ c )
c  {-$CT - 1? (i + P) (i + $c)/r}
( X * x x  + n P X / Y )
Substituting (2.37) and (2.38) into this, I obtain
E ±  = _________C(i + *c){-*c*-i?(i + /?)(i + $ c ) /r }_______
* <+1 (X 4>x x  + rj/32 X/ Y)  (1 + $ c ) + /j/J(1 + 5>c  + C $ Cc) + X 0 X i Cx
References
[1] Barnanke, B. S. and Gertler, M. (1995), “Inside the Black Box: The 
Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission,” Journal of Eco-
79
nomic Perspectives, 9(4): 27-48.
[2] Ball, L. and Romer, D. (1990), “Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality 
of Money,” Review of Economic Studies, 57: 183-203.
[3] Bils, M. and Kahn, J. A, (2000), “What Inventory Behavior Tells Us 
About Business Cycles,” American Economic Review, 90(3): 458-481.
[4] Blinder, A. S. and Fischer, S. (1981), “Inventories, Rational Expec­
tations, and the Business Cycle,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 8 : 
277-304.
[5] Boileau, M. and Letendre, M. A. (2004), “Inventories, Sticky Prices, 
and the Propagation of Nominal Shocks,” University of Colorado and 
McMaster University.
[6 ] Chang, Y., Hornstein, A. and Sarte, P. D. (2004), “Productivity, Em­
ployment, and Inventories,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Work­
ing Paper, 04-09.
[7] Chari, V. V., Kehoe, P. J. and McGrattan, E. R. (2000), “Sticky Price 
Models of the Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the 
Persistence Problem?,” Econometrica, 68(5): 1151-1179.
[8 ] Fischer, S. (1977), “Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and 
the Optimal Money Supply Rule,” Journal of Political Economy, 85: 
191-205.
[9] Hornstein, A. and Sarte, P. D. (2001), “Sticky Prices and Inventories: 
Production Smoothing Reconsidered,” Federal Reserve Bank of Rich­
mond, Working Paper, 01-06.
[10] Ireland, P. N. (2001), “Sticky-Price Models of the Business Cycle: Spec­
ification and Stability,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 47: 3-18.
[11] Khan, A. and Thomas, J. K. (2003), “Inventories and the Business Cy­
cle: an Equilibrium Analysis of (S,s) Policies,” NBER Working Paper, 
10078.
[12] Khan, A. and Thomas, J. K. (2004), “Modeling Inventories over Busi­
ness Cycle,” NBER Working Paper, 10652.
80
[13] King, R. G. and Rebelo, S. T. (1999), “Resuscitating Real Business 
Cycles,” in Taylor, J. B. and Woodford M. (eds), Handbook of Macroe­
conomics, Vol. IB, Chap. 14, 927-1007, North Holland.
[14] Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. C. (1982), “Time to Build and Aggregate 
Fluctuations,” Econometrica, 50: 1345-1370.
[15] Mankiw, N. G. and Reis, R. (2002), “Sticky Information versus Sticky 
Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Philips Curve,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4): 1295-1328.
[16] Metzler, L. A. (1941), “The Nature and Stability of Inventory Cycles,” 
The Review of Economic Statistics, 23: 113-129.
[17] Ramey, V. A. and West, K. D. (1999), “Inventories,” in Taylor, J. B. 
and Woodford, M. (eds), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. IB, Chap. 
13, 863-923, North Holland.
[18] Rotemberg, J. J. (1982), “Sticky Prices in the United States,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 90: 1187-1211.
[19] Taylor, J. B. (1980), “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 88(1): 1-22.
[20] Wen, Y. (2002), “Understanding the Inventory Cycle,” Cornell Univer­
sity, CAE Working Paper, 02-04.
[21] West, K. D. (1990), “The Sources of Fluctuations in Aggregate Inven­
tories and GNP,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(4): 939-71.
[22] Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices, Princeton University Press.
81
Figure 2.1: B aseline Model
Figure2.1.1: Strong sales-facilitating m otive
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Figure2.1.2: W eak sales-facilitating m otive
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Figure 2.2: Unintended Inventories
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Figure 2.3: H eterogeneity in P rice-S ettin g
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Figure2.3.2: D isaggregate  variables 
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U.S. data 0 .5 0 0 .9 4 0 .9 7 0 .7 8
Boileau=Letendre 0 .0 7 1 .3 7 0 .9 2 0.71
Model
(S*. X*) 
(3.367, 3.367) 0 .6 9 0 .81 0 .2 6 0 .1 6
(0.6734, 0.6734) 0 .4 6 0 .9 8 0 .4 4 -0 .01
(3.367, 336.7) 0 .7 3 0 .7 9 0 .1 0 -0 .1 4
(0.6734, 67.34) 0 .7 3 0 .7 9 0 .1 2 -0 .21
Notes:
1. Yis production, S is sales, dX is inventory investment, and dP is inflation.
2. U.S. data are those reported in Boileau and Letendre (2004).
They calculate the sample moments of quarterly data over 1959:1 to 2000:1 
after removing linear-quadratic trends.
3. The results of simulations by Boileau and Letendre (2004) are those from 
their benchmark shopping-cost model.
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Chapter 3 
Financial Accelerator Effects 
in Japan’s Business Cycles1
This chapter calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model which incorpo­
rates credit-market imperfections using Japanese data. The model exhibits 
financial accelerator effects, the mechanism whereby credit-market imperfec­
tions help to propagate or amplify various types of shocks including monetary 
policy shocks to the economy. The main result is that the large volatility of 
Japan’s corporate investment can be explained by taking account of this mech­
anism. I  examine the robustness of the results and consider some variations 
of the model including the adoption of alternative monetary policy rules and 
the introduction of an asset price bubble.
1A revised version of Bank of Japan Working Paper released in August 2002.
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3.1 Introduction
Japan’s economy has experienced large fluctuations especially since the late 
1980s. After strong expansion from 1986 to 1991, long-lasting severe reces­
sions have alternated with short-lived moderate expansions. Among several 
components of real activity to have undergone fluctuations during this pe­
riod, the key factor has been corporate fixed investment. A large number 
of studies have investigated the cause of this volatile investment. While the 
standard neoclassical framework implies that investment is determined by 
expected future business profitability and the cost of capital, many empirical 
studies have suggested that financial factors such as balance sheet conditions 
also influence investment expenditures to some extent, especially those of 
small and medium sized firms, due to agency costs arising from asymmet­
ric information between firms and financial intermediaries. 2  According to 
this view, credit market imperfections help to propagate or amplify various 
types of shocks including monetary policy shocks to the economy. Changes 
in credit market conditions such as asset prices, corporate debt burdens, 
and banking capital adequacies are not simply passive reflections of the real 
economy, but are also in turn major factors that affect real economic ac­
tivity. These feedback mechanisms, which I will specify later as “financial 
accelerator” effects, might have become active when asset prices underwent 
large swings in the late 1980s and early 1990s and when the banking system 
suffered from broad-scale malfunction in the late 1990s.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how financial factors due 
to credit-market imperfections affect economic fluctuations, especially the 
volatility of corporate fixed investment3, in a stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium setting. Although many academic researchers and practitioners 
share the view that financial factors may be important, standard macroeco­
nomic frameworks, both real business cycle models and Keynesian models, 
usually ignore credit-market imperfections. 4  While a large number of pre­
vious studies consider financial factors by estimating a single investment
2See, for example, Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998), Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999), and 
Nagahata and Sekine (2002) for empirical studies which suggest the effects of financial 
factors on investment in Japan.
3 Household consumption and investment may also be affected by credit-market imper­
fections. However, I consider only the effects on corporate investment in this chapter.
4In other words, both real business cycle models and Keynesian models inherently 
subscribe to the Modigliani-Miller theorem (see footnote 14).
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function with corresponding explanatory variables, I calibrate a dynamic 
general equilibrium model which incorporates credit-market imperfections 
using Japanese data.
I follow the standard approach for calibrating a dynamic general equi­
librium model arid begin by identifying the facts underlying Japan’s busi­
ness cycles. Here my interest is focused on the cyclical behaviour of vari­
ables around their balanced growth paths, as captured by the widely-used 
Hodrick-Prescott(HP) filter. Chart 3.1 shows standard deviations and cross 
correlations with output (real GDP) of several detrended series over the 
period from 1980/Q1 to 2001/Q1. I deal here with GDP, corporate fixed 
investment, household consumption, total working hours, the inflation rate, 
and the monetary aggregate. 5 We can see that corporate fixed investment 
during the sample period is nearly five times more volatile than output, and 
that this ratio is much larger than that of the U.S. (about three) . 6  In previ­
ous studies based on real business cycle (RBC) models, the ratio ranges from 
two to three . 7  The gap between the actual volatility and RBC simulated 
volatility suggests the existence of some other types of shocks in addition 
to standard RBC shocks and/or some mechanism that amplifies shocks to 
the economy. I try to make up for this gap by introducing both nominal 
shocks (monetary policy shocks) and credit-market imperfections. I first 
introduce price stickiness into the RBC model, thus setting up the so-called 
dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model, and then introduce credit-market 
imperfections into that DNK model.
The model is based on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)8 (BGG 
hereafter). They embedded a micro financial contracting problem between 
firms (borrowers) and financial intermediaries (lenders) into a macroeco­
nomic DNK framework in a manner that is both rigorous and yet straight­
5GDP, investment, consumption, and working hours are real and per-capita base. In­
flation is measured by changes in the GDP deflator. The monetary aggregate is M2+CD 
(Japan) or M2 (U.S.). All variables except inflation and interest rates are in logarithms 
and seasonally adjusted.
6We can also see that the relative volatility in Japan exceeds four in both subsample 
periods of 1980s and 1990s.
7The relative volatility of investment to output is two in Ohkusa (1991) which calibrated 
a basic RBC model using Japanese data, and is three in King and Rebelo (1999) which 
calibrated one using U.S. data.
8I slightly change their original model: I introduce a monetary policy rule which reacts 
to both output and price level rather than inflation, and simplify entrepreneurs’ net worth 
accumulation (omit entrepreneurs’ consumption and labour supply).
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forward. 9  The model contains households and entrepreneurs (and financial 
intermediaries) distinctively in order to explicitly motivate lending and bor­
rowing. In addition, there are retailers who set the final (retail) price of out­
put goods, capital producers who transform output goods into capital goods, 
and a government sector which conducts fiscal and monetary policy. The 
economy is described as a decentralized rational expectation equilibrium. 
The only source of economic fluctuation comes from unanticipated shocks: 
technology shocks, demand shocks, and monetary policy shocks. The model 
incorporates credit-market imperfections through the assumption that ex­
ternal funds and internal funds are not perfect substitutes: in particular, 
the difference in the cost of these funds (the external finance premium) de­
pends inversely on the value of entrepreneurs’ own wealth (net worth10). 
Procyclical movements in entrepreneurs’ net worth caused by unanticipated 
shocks then lead to countercyclical movements in the external finance pre­
mium, and thus enlarge the volatility of investment and amplify economic 
fluctuations. BGG named this mechanism the “financial accelerator” .
I adopt this model to explain the above facts underlying Japan’s business 
cycles. I set parameter values based on actual Japanese data and calculate 
second moment properties such as standard deviations and cross correla­
tions for both of the price stickiness models: the one with, the other without 
credit-market imperfections. The main result, which I demonstrate fully in 
Section 3.4.3, is that introducing credit-market imperfections significantly 
enlarges the volatility of investment and brings it close to the actual volatil­
ity, without loosing the model’s fit in other dimensions such as consumption 
and inflation. This is one piece of evidence supporting the existence of 
financial accelerator effects in Japan’s business cycles: credit-market imper­
fections help to propagate unanticipated shocks, especially monetary policy 
shocks, and do indeed amplify economic fluctuations. This result supports 
the view emphasizing the importance of financial factors . 11
9 Other important examples which embed credit-market imperfections into a macroe­
conomic dynamic general equilibrium framework are Calmstrom and Fuerst (1997) and 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). However, unlike BGG, they do not introduce a nominal 
rigidity.
10The net worth is defined as liquid assets plus the collateral value of illiquid assets less 
outstanding obligations.
11 Based on an orthodox growth account approach, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) argue 
that the problem in 1990s Japan was not a breakdown of the financial system but a low 
productivity growth rate. Unlike them, however, I focus on cyclical behaviours, so that 
my argument is not necessarily contradictory to theirs.
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I then examine the robustness of the result and consider some variations 
of the model. First I vary some underlying parameter values. I report the 
outcomes of varying the values assigned to key parameters governing en­
trepreneurs’ balance sheet conditions, price stickiness, and labour market 
elasticity. These experiments illustrate various properties of the model and 
may also be of potential simulative interest in considering possible future 
states of the economy. I then adopt alternative monetary policy rules and 
introduce an asset price bubble to the model. In this model, the monetary 
policy rule has a particularly important role in either stabilizing or destabi­
lizing the economy, and these stabilizing effects are stronger in the case with 
the financial accelerator than in the case without it. An asset price bubble 
can be another important source of economic fluctuation in the case with 
financial accelerator effects, and I find that the large volatility of investment 
can be better explained by introducing such a bubble as a supplement to 
the model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I 
explain the functioning of the financial accelerator within a minimal setting 
in which I focus on corporate investment. The rest of the full macroeco­
nomic model is then described in Section 3.3. I calibrate the model using 
Japanese data and calculate the second moment properties in Section 3.4. 
I examine how well these properties correspond to those observed in the 
actual Japanese data, and demonstrate the results in detail. In Section
3 .5 ,1 examine the robustness of the results and consider some variations of 
the model including the adoption of alternative monetary policy rules and 
the introduction of an asset price bubble as mentioned above. Section 3.6 
presents concluding remarks.
3.2 Financial Accelerator Effects on Corporate In­
vestm ent
In this section, I explain the mechanism whereby credit-market imperfec­
tions help to propagate or amplify various types of shocks to the economy, 
the so-called financial accelerator effects, in a minimal setting in which I 
focus on corporate investment. 12  The core model described below will be
12 Other models that explain the financial accelerator more simply in a partial equi­
librium setting are given in Bemanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) and Kasuya and
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one part of the full macroeconomic dynamic general equilibrium model I 
calibrate in this chapter.
3.2.1 The Core Model
I here model the capital-purchasing decisions of “entrepreneurs”. There 
are also external capital producing firms and financial intermediaries pro­
viding external funds in this model. Entrepreneurs purchase capital from 
the capital producers and then produce their output good. In order for the 
entrepreneurs to purchase capital, they have access to external funds in addi­
tion to their own wealth (net worth). Capital producers, on the other hand, 
purchase the entrepreneurs’ output good and transform it into the capital 
good to sell to entrepreneurs. Although the entrepreneurs’ output good will 
be sold out and finally consumed by some other agents (households), here I 
do not describe the behaviour of consumers.
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs purchase capital in each period for use in the subsequent 
period . 1 3  Capital is used in combination with hired labour to produce the 
output good as follows
Yt = A t (K t- 1 )a H 1- a , (3.1)
where Yt , K t , H  are output, capital, and the labour input, respectively. At 
is an exogenous technology parameter (total factor productivity). Here the 
labour input and the payments fpr it, corresponding to its marginal product, 
are assumed to be fixed.
Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. Their demand for capital is determined 
by comparing the expected marginal return to holding capital with its ex­
pected marginal financial cost. Given the production technology (3.1), the
Fukunaga (2003). Here I extract the minimal setting straightforwardly from the dynamic 
general equilibrium model of BGG.
13I here assume that the economy contains a large number of identical entrepreneurs 
and describe the model below as the representative entrepreneur’s problem. (This assump­
tion also holds for the capital producers, households, and retailers I will describe later.) 
To consider the credit-market imperfections explicitly, I should start from the individual 
firm subject to idiosyncratic risk on its return to capital, as BGG does. However, some 
assumptions, such as the independent and identical distributions of the idiosyncratic dis­
turbances and the constant returns to scale in production, allow me to derive aggregate 
relationships straightforwardly.
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ex-post gross return to holding a unit of capital from t to t +  1, Ft+i, is 
defined as
t+i =  — — * (3-2)
where Qt is the relative price (in terms of the output good) of a unit of 
capital which varies depending on the capital production technology (de­
scribed below) and is taken as given. S is the depreciation rate of capital. 
The first term of the numerator, , is the income gain, corresponding to 
the rent paid to a unit of capital that is assumed to be diminishing returns. 
The second term is the capital gain, which is all enjoyed by entrepreneurs 
rather than capital producers who must earn zero profits in competitive 
equilibrium.
The financial cost condition for the capital-purchasing decision is the 
main feature of this model. In the standard framework, the expected rate 
of return is always taken to be equal to the marginal opportunity cost of 
funds, such as the riskless interest rate, Rt+1 , which is given independently 
of entrepreneurs’ decision making.
Et Ft+i =  Rt+i-
In contrast, here I assume that there exist credit-market imperfections whereby 
additional costs are imposed on borrowers if they demand external funds (un­
collateralized loans) to purchase more of the capital good than they are able 
to purchase using only internal funds (collateral value) . 1 4  Following BGG,
I consider the situation where lenders (financial intermediaries) must pay 
a cost if they wish to observe borrowers’ (entrepreneurs’) realized returns.
In this situation, the optimal (state-contingent) contract between lenders 
and borrowers looks like a standard debt contract under which lenders only 
observe the realized return of the borrowers who could not earn enough 
to repay at some predetermined rate (contingent on the realized aggregate 
state); lenders then withdraw all of the observed return from the bankrupt 
borrowers. 1 5 In such a situation the auditing cost lenders must pay can be 
interpreted as the cost of default. Since competitive lenders must receive an
14Under perfect credit markets, there are no additional costs of external funds and no 
distinction between external and internal funds (the Modigliani-Miller theorem).
15This type of setting is referred to as “costly state verification (CSV),” a problem 
analyzed first by Townsend (1979).
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expected return to lending (less the auditing cost) equal to the opportunity 
cost of their funds, the borrowers’ expected rate of return (Et Ft+i) must 
exceed the riskless interest rate (Rt+i) to compensate for the default cost. 
The default risk itself is determined by the extent to which entrepreneurs 
depend on external funds, and this leads to a relationship between two cru­
cial ratios: the ratio of E* Ft+i to Rt+i, which I call the external finance 
premium, and the ratio of internal (or alternatively external) funds to the 
total value of purchased capital, as follows1 6
Et F t+ 1 = R t+ 1  S  ( ^ )  with Nt <  Q t K t , S (l) =  1, S'(-) <  0, (3.3)
where Nt is entrepreneurs’ own wealth (net worth). When the ratio of 
internal funds is low, the default risk is high, and in this case the external 
finance premium should be large . 1 7  Note that the above condition is an ex- 
ante relationship, that is, (3.3) holds only for the expected values conditional 
on the information available in period t rather than for every realization 
of Ft+1 . Note also that entrepreneurs borrow only if they cannot afford 
their optimal capital stock; their internal funds are always used fully (thus 
N t < QtKt) because the cost of internal funds is always lower than that of 
external funds for them . 1 8
While the conditions of demand for capital (3.2) and financial cost (3.3) 
mutually determine the static features of the entrepreneurs’ capital-purchasing 
decision, the evolution of their net worth together with the variations in the 
price of capital play an critical role in the dynamics of this model. The net 
worth evolves according to
Nt =  ' y { F ,  Q t - i K t - i  -  R t  S  ( Q ^ )  ( Q t - i K t - i  -  }, (3.4)
where I assume that each entrepreneur has a constant probability 7  of sur­
viving to the next period (i.e. there is a probability 1  — 7  that he dies in 
between periods) . 1 9  The terms in the braces describe the operational firm’s
16 Here I do not describe the optimal contracting problem, which is fully described in 
Appendix A of BGG.
17S(-) is not entrepreneur-specific so that all entrepreneurs choose the same ratio of 
internal funds.
18This is referred to as the “pecking order” assumption.
19 This assumption preclude the probability either that the net worth diverges or en­
trepreneurs accumulate enough wealth to be fully self-financed so that credit markets 
disappear. This is essentially the same situation as that described by Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (1997) where infinitely lived entrepreneurs discount the future more heavily than
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value (equity): the first term is gross return; the second is a repayment term 
which includes compensation for the potential cost of default (the auditing 
cost) reflecting the external finance premium. Note that Ft is the ex-post 
rate of return so that the above condition (3.4) holds for every realized re­
turn, unlike (3.3). If an unanticipated movement in the returns such as an 
unpredictable variation in the capital (asset) price, Qt, occurs within period 
I, the ex-post return diverges from the financial costs and the net worth 
is directly affected. Under credit-market imperfections, the net worth re­
sponds endogenously to such unanticipated shocks, and this in turn affects 
economic fluctuations via its interaction with the external finance premium.
C ap ita l P roducers
Capital producers purchase the entrepreneurs’ output good as a material 
input, I*, and combine it with rented capital, K t- 1 , to produce new capital, 
K t, as follows2 0
k t = §  ( - ^ - )  K t - 1  with $ ( 0 ) =  0 , $'(•) >  0 , $"(•) <  0 .
To capture the empirical fact that corporate investment slightly lags output 
as shown in Chart 3.1, I assume that the capital producers’ purchasing 
decision has to be made one period in advance. They choose next period 
expenditure, It+i, to maximize their expected profits, E* [ Qt+i Kt+i — 
taking the expected relative price of capital, EtQt+i, as given. The first- 
order condition is
- l
E* Qt+i =  E*
Here I normalize the capital production function so that the relative price 
of capital is unity in the steady state, i.e. $ ' ( I /K)  = 1 where I  and K  
without time subscripts are the steady-state values. I interpret the capital
do households (in the core model here, their discount rate is higher than the riskless inter­
est rate, R t). Meanwhile, the birth rate is set to keep the total number of entrepreneurs 
constant. I do not consider an inheritance problem by assuming implicitly that the be­
quest which would be left by the dead entrepreneurs perishes immediately on his death, 
while the new generation of entrepreneurs (and those losing their net worth by default) are 
given some wealth to begin operations. BGG deal with this problem more explicitly by 
introducing entrepreneurs’ inelastic labour supply and consumption. However, this does 
not change the essential dynamic properties of the model.
20The concavity of the following capital production function (<£"(•) <  0) implies in­
creasing marginal adjustment costs.
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producers’ expenditure, It, as “investment” for capital. Their decision is 
linked with the entrepreneurs’ capital-purchasing decision described above 
via the variation in the price of capital.
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
K t = $  K t - 1 +  ( l - t f )  K t-u  (3.6)
where S is the depreciation rate. Capital is homogeneous so that there is 
no difference between newly-produced and old capital. Old capital used 
by entrepreneurs is rented out for the production of new capital, and then 
returned at the same price as the newly-produced capital. 21
Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium is defined as a set of endogenous vari­
ables {Yt, K t , Nt, It, Ft , Q t}  which satisfies entrepreneurs’ decision rules 
(3.2) and (3.3) (the latter implicitly includes financial intermediaries’ deci­
sions), capital producers’ decision rule (3.5), and resource constraints (3.1), 
(3.4), and (3.6), given that the exogenous variables { Rt, A t } follow the 
stochastic processes defined below:
rt =  pr n - 1  +  ert (3.7)
at = pa at- i  + eat , (3.8)
where and at are percentage deviations from the steady states of Rt and 
At, respectively. ert and eat are random variables distributed normally and 
uncorrelated both serially and contemporaneously. These are assumed to be 
stationary autoregressive processes (i.e. they do not contain trend growth).
I can analyze the dynamics of the model by restricting my attention to 
stationary fluctuations around the steady state. I log-linearize the system 
as follows.
yt = at + a k t- i  (3.9)
f t  = (1 -  v) (yt -  h - 1 ) + v q t -  qt- i  (3.10)
Et ft+i = n + 1  -  ip [ n t ~  (qt + h ) ]  (3.11)
21 The rental rate is determined by the zero profit condition for competitive capital 
producers using constant returns to scale technology. It must be zero in the steady-state.
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nt =  l F  [ x f t - ( x ~ l ) n
+  $  (x  -  1) (Qt-1 +  h - 1 ) +  { l - ' 0 ( x - l ) }  n t- 1 ] (3.12)
E* qt+i = (f> (Et it+i — kt) (3.13)
h  = <Ht +  (l-<S)fct_i. (3.14)
Equations (3.9) through (3.14) correspond to equations (3.1) through (3.6),
respectively. 2 2  Following the convention, all lowercase variables denote per­
centage deviations from steady state . 2 3
3.2.2 Financial Accelerator Effects
I here demonstrate the financial accelerator effects by examining the re­
sponses of the six endogenous variables in the core model to one-shot unan­
ticipated shocks to each exogenous variable, consisting of a one percent 
deviation from the steady state economy. 2 4  I choose parameter values based 
on actual data (historical averages), single-equation estimation, or references 
to preceding studies (shown in Chart 3.2), as detailed in the fuller discussion 
in Section 3.4.1 below . 2 5  Each variable converges to the steady-state even­
tually under those parameter values, which means that the system is stable 
around the steady-state. Responses to the interest-rate shock are shown in 
Chart 3.3, and to the technology shock in Chart 3.4. 2 6
First I examine the effects of changes in monetary policy which can 
control the real riskless interest rate rt in Chart 3.3. In the upper panel, ip is 
set to zero so that there are no credit-market imperfections (the no financial 
accelerator case, or the No-FA case). When the interest rate (always equal 
to the expected rate of return) rises, investment decreases at first (from the 
subsequent period to the initial shock), but reverts to the steady-state level
22I shift the time subscripts in (3.10) backward from (3.2) because it is an ex-post 
relationship subject to unanticipated shocks within the period.
23Uppercase variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values. Greek letters 
without time subscripts are fixed parameters, e.g. x  is the steady-state value of the 
reciprocal of the self-financing ratio, .
24When solving the model, I shift the time subscripts of the riskless interest rate appear­
ing in any equation one period backward in order to distinguish the ex-post relationships 
which are subject to the unanticipated shock from those which are not.
25The first-order autoregressive parameter on the shock process for the riskless interest 
rate, pr , which is endogenized in the whole model later, is here arbitrarily set to 0.5.
26 The model is solved by the method of undetermined coefficient (the eigen decom­
position method). I utilize Harald Uhlig’s MATLAB programs which are available at his 
homepage (http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wpol/html/toolkit.htm). The detailed method­
ological exposition is given in Uhlig (1999).
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as the shock dies away. In the lower panel depicting the case with credit- 
market imperfections (the FA case), on the other hand, investment remains 
lower than the steady-state level even after the shock dies away, and capital 
and output continue to deviate from their steady-states for an accordingly 
long time. This persistency comes from the damage to entrepreneurs’ net 
worth caused by the unanticipated fall in the price of capital during the 
initial period. It takes a long time for the damaged net worth to return 
to its steady-state level. The damage to the net worth causes the external 
finance premium to widen in the FA case, which in turn further dampens 
the demand for capital.
Next, I examine the effects of technology shocks, or changes in a*, in 
Chart 3.4. When a positive technology shock boosts output, the demand for 
capital is stimulated via an upward shift in the marginal product of capital. 
In the FA case, moreover, the improvement in entrepreneurs’ net worth 
further stimulates the demand for capital via a reduction in the external 
finance premium. Therefore, the technology shock is also amplified in the 
FA case.
I will check the impulse responses again in Section 3.4.2 within the full 
macroeconomic framework. However, the essence of the financial accelerator 
effects have been demonstrated by the core model.
3.3 The W hole M odel
I now develop the core model toward the full macroeconomic dynamic New 
Keynesian (DNK) framework, including households, retailers, and a govern­
ment sector, in addition to entrepreneurs, capital producers, and financial 
intermediaries.
3.3.1 Households
Here I set up a general equilibrium framework within which entrepreneurs’ 
output goods are finally consumed by households. Households live infinitely, 
and they consume, work, and save. Their intertemporal optimization prob­
lem is written as follows
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,n  i H J ? „  t E( X X  [ ln(C'+<c) +  f  M ^ )  +  i  ln(l -  Ht+k) }{Ct},{Mt},{Ht} “  -Ti+fc
s .t.C t + Dt+i + ^ -  = Wt Ht - T t + Vt + R tD t + ^ ,  
r t  r't
where Ct is consumption, ^  is real money balances, Ht is labour supply, 
Wt is the real wage, Tt is a lump-sum tax, Vt is dividends received from 
ownership of retailers (explained below), Dt is deposits held at financial 
intermediaries, and Rt is the riskless interest rate on these deposits (gross 
and in real terms). The intermediaries lending funds to many entrepreneurs 
can perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic risk on their return, which enables 
households to earn the riskless rate on their deposits.
The first order conditions are
1
Ct
= P r  Rt+i (3.15)
Mt
Pt
r r  W t+i (3.16)
1
c l
=  t  1
4 1 - H t ’
(3.17)
where Rnt+ 1 is the (gross) nominal interest rate, defined as Rt+i ^
Now both the real interest rate and labour supply are endogenized.
3 .3 .2  R e ta ile rs
Here I assume that entrepreneurs sell all of their output good to retailers. 
Retailers then sell final output goods to households, capital producers, and 
the government sector. Whereas the entrepreneurs’ output good is homoge­
neous, retailers differentiate it slightly at no resource cost and then have the 
monopolistic power to set the prices of these final output goods. Following 
Calvo (1983), I assume that the retailers have the opportunity to change 
their prices in a given period only with probability 1 — 6 . Then price sticki­
ness, the degree of which is represented by 0 , is introduced in keeping with 
the conventional dynamic New Keynesian framework.
The reason why retailers are incorporated together with entrepreneurs 
is that the relationship between an individual entrepreneur’s demand for 
capital and his net worth cannot avoid being too complicated to aggregate 
straightforwardly if entrepreneurs are imperfect competitors. Retailers here
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are simply a device for introducing price stickiness. Ultimately retailers’ 
monopolistic profits belong to the households who own them, in contrast to 
entrepreneurs who are independent agents possessing their own wealth.
Retailers who have the opportunity to set their price in a given period 
t choose their price, Pt*, that maximizes their expected discounted profits 
until the period when they are next able to change their price, subject to 
their individual demand function faced.
bility that retailers cannot change their price in the next period, and the 
households’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. X t is the gross 
mark-up rate of retail (final) price over wholesale price. Y*t is the demand 
corresponding to the optimally chosen price P*. Yt is aggregate demand. Pt 
is the aggregate price given by
The optimally chosen price P* can be expressed explicitly as follows
max
The discount factor for expected profits consists of two parts: the proba-
pt = {o p/_7 + (i -  9) p;1-' } A .
I here approximate percentage deviations from the steady state of P  and P* 
within their local neighbourhood as follows
pt = 0 p t-i + { l - 0 )p*t
oo
j = 0
where lowercase variables denote percentage deviations. Then the so-called
New Keynesian Phillips curve can be derived as follows
7Tt =  - X x t  + P Et 7Tt+l, 
where irt = p t — p t-i  and A =  6 ~l (1 — 6 ) (1 — (50).
(3.18)
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By introducing price stickiness, I have to slightly modify the entrepreneurs’ 
behaviour in the core model. Evaluating the rent paid to a unit of capital,
in terms of the retail price of output goods, (3.2) is rewritten as
p  + <5 * + 1 (1_<5) ( 3  ig\
Ft+X  - ----------------------- Qt--------  (3.19)
In the same way, evaluating the marginal product of labour in terms of the 
retail price, I should write the entrepreneurs’ labour demand condition as 
follows
Wt =  T  (1 ~ f f )y t - (3-2°)At -tit
This condition and the households’ labour supply condition, (3.17), give the 
labour market equilibrium.
3.3.3 Government Sector and Monetary Policy Rule
Finally I set the budget constraint and the policy rule of the government sec­
tor to close the whole model. The total expenditure of the economy, which 
is always equal to the aggregate of final output goods, consists of house­
holds’ consumption, capital producers’ investment, and the expenditure of 
the government sector, G.
Y t =  C t  +  I t  +  G t . (3.21)
Government expenditure is financed by lump-sum taxes and money creation.
Gt =  M‘ ~ Mt-!  + T p  (3.22)
•Ct
Here I take the nominal interest rate as the instrument of monetary 
policy. The monetary aggregate is then endogenized in the money demand 
function, (3.16). Following the spirit of the Taylor rule, I specify the policy 
rule as follows2 7
rnt+1 =  Pn rnt +  (1 -  Pn) rn*t+i +  ent , ent ~  N (0, <rn2) (3.23)
rn*t+1 =  VyVt +  ^ E t p t + i  with vy, vp > 0 ,
27I do not model the policy objective function explicitly. Within this type of macroe­
conomic framework, optimizing behaviour should be linked to the underlying structure of 
economy and would involve imposing a number of additional restrictions throughout the 
model. Dealing tractably with such restrictions seems beyond the scope of my current 
treatment.
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where rn*t+ 1 is the target value of the nominal interest rate and e” is an 
exogenous random shock to the interest rate which reflects either failure to 
track the rule or intentional transitory deviations from the rule (pure “policy 
shocks”). The first equation describes the mechanism of partial adjustment 
observed in reality, while the second is the policy reaction function which 
responds to current output and the expected price level in order to stabilize 
the economy. 2 8  Note that rnt+i, yt, and pt are all percentage deviations from 
steady-state so that they carry the implication of “gaps” . According to this 
rule, the monetary authority (here included in the government sector) raises 
the nominal interest rate (sets it above its steady-state level) when current 
output exceeds its steady-state and/or prices are expected to exceed their 
steady-state level, and vice versa . 2 9
The partial adjustment mechanism and the forward-looking reaction 
(targeting expected future prices rather than current or past prices) fol­
low Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). Unlike Clarida et al., however, I here 
adopt a price-level reaction rule rather than an inflation reaction rule which 
would be more popular and nearer to the original Taylor rule . 3 0  The reason 
is that using an inflation reaction rule in this model is liable to cause inde­
terminacy of the steady state equilibrium, as I discuss in Section 3.5.2. I 
estimate this policy rule in my benchmark parameterization in Section 3.4.1 
and try alternative parameterizations in Section 3.5.2.
For fiscal policy, on the other hand, there is no rule. Like the technology 
parameter, government expenditure, Gt, follows a stationary autoregressive 
process as follows.
9 t = Pg gt- 1  +  e9t, e9t ~  N (0, a52), (3.24)
where gt is the percentage deviation from steady-state and e9t is a serially 
uncorrelated random shock.
28The above conditions on the coefficients, uy , up >  0, are normally imposed to make 
the policy rule stabilize the economy.
29I do not consider the non-negative condition of the nominal interest rate. If the 
steady-state interest rate is near the zero boundary, the monetary policy shocks may be 
distributed asymmetrically.




I have now described the whole model. As in the core model, I define a ratio­
nal expectations equilibrium as a set of endogenous variables which satisfies 
entrepreneurs’ decision rules (3.19), (3.3), and (3*20), capital producers’ de­
cision rule (3.5), households’ decision rule (3.15), (3.16), and (3.17), retailers’ 
decision rule (3.18), and resource constraints (3.1), (3.4), (3.6), and (3.21), 
given the stochastic processes (3.23), (3.8), and (3.24). Then I log-linearize 
the system around the steady state as follows.
yt
ct
— C I  . GY  ^t y  y  9t
— n+i +  ct+i
(3.25)
(3.26)
ft = ( 1  -  v) (yt -  x t -  k t-i)  + v q t -  qt- 1 (3.27)
Et ft+i = rt+1 -  [ nt -  (qt +  h )  } (3.28)
Et qt+i = (j> (Et it+i — kt) (3.29)
Vt = at + a k t- \  +  ( 1  — a) ht (3.30)
ht
*t _
■ \ ln (yt Xt1  +  Vh
—X Xt +  /?Ef 7Tt+l
(3.31)
(3.32)
h = <5 it +  (1 — <£) kt—i (3.33)
nt = j F  l x f t - ( x - i ) n
+ i > ( x - 1) (5 t - i  +  * t-i) +  { i - V , (x - i )}»»«- i ] (3.34)
Tt+1 =  r nt+ 1 -  E t TTt+1 (3.35)
n  =  P t - P t - i  (3.36)
m - p t  =  Q -  i  r nt+ 1 (3.37)
r nt+ 1 =  pn r nt +  (1 -  pn) (Vy y t +  vp Et P t+ 1 )
+  e n t , e n t  ~  N ( 0 ,  a n 2) (3.38)
<H =  padt-i + e at, eat ~  AT(0, aa2) (3.39)
gt = pggt-i + e9t, e9t ~  iV(0, <j92). (3.40)
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(3.25) is the log-linearized version of the resource constraint, (3.21). 
Household consumption and corporate investment are described by equa­
tions (3.26) through (3.29). (3.26) is the Euler equation of households’ 
consumption derived from (3.15), and corresponds to the IS equation of a 
Keynesian model. (3.27) through (3.29) are almost the same as equations 
(3.10), (3.11), and (3.13) in the core model.
(3.30) is the log-linearized version of the production function. (3.31) is 
the condition for labour market equilibrium derived from (3.17) and (3.20). 
(3.32) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve (3.18). (3.33) and (3.34), which 
describe the evolution of the state variables, are the same as (3.14) and 
(3.12) in the core model.
(3.35) is the Fischer equation defining the relationship between the nomi­
nal and real interest rates, (3.36) is the definition of the inflation rate. (3.37) 
describes households’ money demand derived from (3.16), and corresponds 
to the LM equation of a Keynesian model. (3.38) is the monetary policy 
rule derived from (3.23), which also prescribes the shock process governing 
the nominal interest rate.
(3.39) and (3.40) are the shock processes governing the technology pa­
rameter (the same as (3.8) in the core model) and government expenditure 
(the same as (3.24) above), respectively. All of the three random variables 
in the model, ezt , ea*, and e9t, are uncorrelated both serially and contem­
poraneously.
3.4 Results
Using the whole log-linearized model, I conduct some quantitative experi­
ments in this section. As I did for the core model above, I again examine 
the responses of variables to exogenous shocks. In addition, I calculate the 
second moment properties of the model such as the standard deviations 
and cross correlations with output (real GDP), and examine how well these 
properties correspond to those observed in the actual Japanese data.
3.4.1 Parameterization
First of all, I set parameter values to calibrate the model to Japan’s economy. 
As a rule, I choose them based on actual data (historical averages), single­
equation estimation, or by reference to preceding studies. A list of the
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chosen values for the benchmark parameterization is shown in Chart 3.2. 
Some alternative parameterizations are discussed later in Section 3.5.1.
Steady-state values of the shares of household consumption, corporate 
fixed investment, and other exogenous expenditures (the expenditure of the 
government sector in the model) in the total expenditure of the economy are 
determined as historical averages of their values in the Japanese National 
Accounts over the period from 1980/Q1 to 2001/Q1, which I take as the main 
sample period . 3 1  The capital share, a, and the depreciation rate of capital, 
J, are calculated as averages over the sample period, using the Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) data, which is constructed from the National Accounts.
Households’ discount factor, (3 (= l /R ) ,  is set to 0.995 following Ohkusa 
(1991) and Soejima (1997). As is usual with the standard real business 
cycle (RBC) model, the parameter on leisure preference is determined by the 
steady-state fraction of time spent working: 0.268 is the historical average 
in Japan, which implies a labour supply elasticity of 2.737.
The parameter on price stickiness, 0, is set to 0.75, which implies that 
price adjustments occur on average once every four periods (a year). This 
value lies within the range of estimation results for the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve calculated by Fuchi and Watanabe (2002) using Japanese 
data. The steady-state elasticity of the price of capital (Q) to the ratio of 
investment to capital stock (I / K ) is set to 0.25 following BGG.
I take the steady-state elasticity of the external finance premium (S ) 
with respect to the ratio of capital to net worth (x), which determine the 
effectiveness of the financial accelerator, as 0.05 following BGG . 3 2  Among 
the principal conditions governing BGG’s choice of this value are that x  is 2 
and that S  is annually 200 basis points. These conditions also offer a close 
fit to historical averages in Japan as well. 3 3  I also follow BGG in setting the 
survival rate of entrepreneurs, 7 , to 0.9728.
The parameters relating to the monetary policy rule and exogenous shock
31Data before 1980 (partly before 1990) are not available in the new standard (1993 
SNA) Japanese National Accounts.
32BGG give this value based on a rigorous numerical solution to the optimal contract­
ing problem between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries which I did not set up 
precisely in the core model.
33According to the previous standard (1968 SNA) National Accounts, the historical 
average of x  from 1980 to 1998 fiscal year is 1.982. The historical average of the spread 
between the average contracted lending rate and the official discount rate is annually 241 
(long term) or 144 (short term) basis points.
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processes axe all given by estimation. I estimate the policy reaction func­
tion (3.38) using the Overnight call rate and the National Accounts data 
detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter over the sample period . 3 4  I 
also estimate the first-order autoregressive parameter on the shock processes 
governing total factor productivity and exogenous expenditures, pa and pg 
respectively, using data calculated from the National Accounts. 3 5 ,3 6  I apply 
the standard errors in these estimations to the standard deviations of the 
innovations in the corresponding shock processes, an, <ra and ag.
3.4.2 Impulse Responses
I here examine the responses of the whole model to three types of shocks: 
a monetary policy shock, a technology shock (to total factor productivity) 
and a demand shock (to exogenous expenditures). Chart 3.5 to 3.7 show 
the results for each type of shock.
First I examine the effects of monetary policy, here those of a policy 
shock which works through the above policy rule controlling the nominal 
interest rate, in Chart 3.5. A tightening policy shock raises the real interest 
rate as well as the nominal interest rate, which causes the main real variables 
to respond in almost the same way as those in the core model, where it is 
the real interest rate that provides the exogenous monetary policy shock. In 
addition, the variables introduced in the whole model such as money and 
inflation respond in the right direction theoretically. 3 7
The responses to the technology shock in Chart 3.6 are different from
34Following Clarida et al. (1998) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999), I estimate the pa­
rameters, uy , i/p, and pn, using the generalized method of moments (GMM). The instru­
ment set includes a constant, plus 1-4 lags of log-differenced real GDP, the log-differenced 
GDP deflator, and the call rate. For the expected future price level, I take the fourth 
period (one year) lead of the realized data.
35I calculate the total factor productivity, A t, by subtracting weighted (by a) factor 
inputs from real GDP in logarithms, and the exogenous expenditures, G t, by subtracting 
household consumption and corporate fixed investment from GDP in real terms.
36 Following much of the RBC literatures, I estimate the first-order autoregressive param­
eter governing A t (and G t) using level data (taking logarithms) together with a constant 
and a linear trend term. I can alternatively use the HP-filter-detrended data as before, 
which gives much smaller estimates (around 0.5 and 0.6) than those usually calibrated in 
the literature.
37Inflation responds immediately before the peak of the response of real GDP, which is 
contradictory to the stylized fact shown in many empirical studies that monetary policy 
shocks initially impact on real variables and then have a delayed and gradual effects on 
inflation. As I mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, it is the Calvo-type price setting which I 
assume in this chapter to cause this problem.
106
those of the core model. Under my parameterization, when a positive tech­
nology shock hits the economy, entrepreneurs’ net worth does not improve 
but deteriorates. This is partly because the policy reaction function coun­
teracts the positive effects of the shock, and partly because an expansion of 
the mark up due to price stickiness causes the rent paid to a unit of capital 
in terms of the retail price to depreciate.3 8  The external finance premium 
thus dampens the demand for capital in the FA case, which counteracts 
rather than amplifies the positive responses of investment and real GDP. 
Therefore, the technology shock is less amplified in the FA case, which is 
the reverse of the outcome in the core model. 3 9
A positive demand shock also boosts real GDP and investment, although 
the rise in the interest rate counteracts this effect, making the increases more 
modest, as shown in Chart 3.7. Entrepreneurs’ net worth here improves and 
the external finance premium diminishes, which means that the shock is 
more amplified in the FA case.
3.4.3 Second Moment Properties
As the main quantitative experiment, I calculate second moment properties 
of the model such as standard deviations and cross correlations with output 
(real GDP), and examine how well these properties correspond to those ob­
served in the actual Japanese data, illustrated in Chart 3.1. The random 
variables in this model are the innovations in the three shock process, en*, 
e°t, and e9t, and these innovations are assumed to be distributed normally 
and uncorrelated both serially and contemporaneously. 4 0  I generate stochas­
tically one hundred simulated sets4 1  consisting of a complete dynamic path 
over the full 85 periods of the sample. For the purpose of comparison with 
the actual data in Chart 3.1, I calculate the HP-filtered moments from the 
simulated data. Chart 3.8 shows the results of the simulation-based sample
38Meanwhile, households’ welfare improves because retailers’ monopolistic profits which 
belong to households increase, accompanied by the expansion of the mark up.
39 This outcome depends on the parameterization, especially that of the policy reaction 
and price stickiness terms. In BGG, the policy reaction to output is set to zero (omitted) 
and hence, like the other shocks, the technology shocks are also more amplified in the FA 
case.
40In the actual data, my parameterization implies that the first order sample autocor­
relation of ent is 0.313, of eat is -0.238, and of e9t is 0.064, and that the sample cross 
correlation between ent and eat is 0.079, between ent and e9t is -0.187, and between e°t 
and e9t is 0.302.
41The number of simulated sets, one hundred, follows Soejima (1997).
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moments, together with the sample standard errors for each of them.
The main result is that the FA case produces more volatile corporate 
investment (the standard deviation, shown in Chart 3.8, is 4.36) than the 
No-FA case (3.36), and corresponds more closely to the actual data (5.32 in 
Chart 3.1) though still a little bit short. The sample standard errors (0.51 in 
the FA case and 0.35 in the No-FA case) imply that the difference between 
the results from the two cases seems significant. We can interpret this result 
as one piece of evidence supporting the existence of financial accelerator 
effects in Japan’s business cycles.
For other variables, meanwhile, the difference between the two cases 
does not seem to be significant. Moreover, the volatilities of these variables 
correspond relatively well to the actual data in both cases. A remarkable 
exception, however, is total working hours. The volatility the model pro­
duces for this variable is, in both cases (2.32 in the FA case and 2.17 in the 
No-FA case) far larger than that of the actual data (0.62 in Chart 3.1). This 
point will be discussed later when I vary the parameter value governing the 
elasticity of the labour supply, r)h, in Section 3.5.1.
For the cross correlations with real GDP, whether the FA or No-FA 
case, the correspondence of the simulated data to the actual data are poorer 
than those for the standard deviations. The higher-order autocorrelations of 
most variables in the simulated data are too small, although this problem is 
generally shared with many simple RBC models. While the model reproduce 
the high cross correlations of investment maintained for some lags, it fails 
to generate the lagged inflation mainly due to the Calvo-type price setting.
3.5 Variations of The M odel
I have obtained the result that in the FA case the model produces more 
volatile corporate investment which corresponds more closely to the actual 
data than it does in the No-FA case. In this section, I examine the robustness 
of this result and consider some variations of the model by varying some un­
derlying parameter values, adopting alternative monetary policy rules, and 
introducing an asset price bubble into the model. These experiments illus­
trate various properties of the model and may also be of potential simulative 
interest in considering possible future states of the economy.
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3.5.1 Alternative Parameter Values
First I try varying the benchmark parameterization set out in Section 3.4.1. 
This may be of potential simulative interest in considering possible future 
states of the economy, as well as providing a robustness check on the sen­
sitivity of the benchmark results. Chart 3.9 shows some alternative results 
for the standard deviations in the No-FA and FA cases obtained by varying 
the values for x> and rjh, which are the three important and sensitive 
underlying parameters in the model.
First, if the steady state ratio of internal funds is lower (that is, x  1S 
higher) than the benchmark value (the ratio is 0.5, or equivalently x  is 2), the 
volatility of corporate investment in the FA case increases and comes closer 
to the actual volatility, although other parameters remain little changed. 4 2  
This is because the effectiveness of the financial accelerator expands as the 
share of external financing rises. 4 3  The result is in contrast to the No-FA 
case, in which changes in x  leave the volatility unchanged.
Secondly, if retailers can change their prices more frequently, for example 
as a result of deregulation making a more competitive environment, the 
volatility of the economy as a whole is reduced although that of inflation 
itself is increased. The range within which I vary the value for 6 in the chart 
is in line with the estimation results of Fuchi and Watanabe (2002). Since the 
propagation of the monetary policy shock is sensitive to the degree of price 
stickiness, the volatility caused by the monetary policy shock is sensitive to 
variation in 9. In the No-FA case, this sensitivity is less than in the FA case.
Thirdly, if households supply their labour less elastically with respect 
to wages, the volatilities of working hours, investment, and real GDP are 
reduced while those of consumption and real money balances are increased. 
The numerical example in the chart suggests that very small elasticity is 
required in order to reproduce the actual volatility of working hours. In the 
No-FA case, the sensitivity is once again less than in the FA case.
42When x  increases, the elasticity that is fixed here may also increase. Then 
the volatility of corporate investment may further increase beyond the result shown in 
Chart 3.9.
43However, if the steady state ratio of internal funds is lower than about 20% (that is, 
X exceeds 5), the effectiveness of the financial accelerator and the volatility of investment 
tend to diminish. This is the phase of an “excessive external finance premium” which 
Kasuya and Fukunaga (2003) pointed out.
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3.5.2 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
In the whole model above, the monetary policy rule has a particularly impor­
tant role in either stabilizing or destabilizing the economy. Here I compare 
the performances of alternative policy rules in both the No-FA and FA cases 
and examine their properties in the context of this model.
First I try varying the estimated benchmark parameter values for the 
price-level reaction rule, (3.23). The standard deviations for each parame­
terization in both the No-FA and FA cases are shown in Chart 3.10. Moving 
from an extreme situation in which monetary policy does not react at all 
to economic conditions (i.e. both vy and i/p are zero), the benchmark rule 
stabilizes all variables appearing in the table. As I give larger values to the 
reaction parameters (for example, vy — up = 2 ), the economy is further sta­
bilized. We can see that those stabilizing effects are stronger in the FA case 
than in the No-FA case. Under an active reaction rule such as uy =  i/p = 2, 
corporate fixed investment in the FA case is strongly stabilized by the pol­
icy so that its volatility can be smaller than in the No-FA case and the 
benchmark result in Section 3.4.3 is overturned.
We can also see that the stabilizing effects of the two terms, vy and vp, 
which constitute the policy rule work in different directions. Chart 3.11 
shows the stabilizing effects on output (real GDP) and inflation, generally 
considered to be the two objectives of monetary policy. As I give a larger 
value to i/y, inflation becomes volatile while output is stabilized. This means 
that we are confronted with a tradeoff between the two objectives. Mean­
while, as I increase the value of vp above the benchmark value (0.03), both 
output and inflation are stabilized to some extent. This implies that the 
benchmark rule leaves room for further stabilization of the economy through 
more active reaction to the price-level. When vp exceeds some threshold, 
however, inflation continues to be further stabilized but output tends to 
increase volatility, 4 4  and we eventually confront the tradeoff. 4 5
Next I consider alternative specifications of the policy rule including the
44The lower limit on the standard deviation of output is around 0.6, which the rule 
vv =  up =  2 of these examples almost achieves. Any active rule cannot stabilize output 
over this limit.
45With an exogenous nominal shock process to the price setting rule (3.18) instead of 
the monetary policy rule (the policy rule is then always implemented and completely en- 
dogenized), following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), the tradeoff between the variances 
of output and inflation would be presented more clearly.
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reaction to inflation. I replace the price-level reaction term in the benchmark 
specification (3.23) with an inflation reaction term as follows.
r n t + 1  =  pn rnt +  (1 -  Pn) rn*t+i +  ent, ent ~  iV(0, an2) (3.41)
rn*t+i = VyVt +  v*E17rt+i with i/yi v* > 0 .
This specification is nearer to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and the 
original Taylor rule .4 6  Although this type of specification is popular, it does 
not work well in this model. When I set un to below unity (say 0.5), both 
output and inflation are destabilized since the real interest rate moves in 
the opposite direction to the nominal rate. If I choose a value larger than 
unity for i/,, however, prices do not return to the original level after a shock 
and the steady state equilibrium becomes indeterminate . 4 7  To avoid this 
indeterminacy, I should again add a price-level reaction term to the above 
specification (3.41).
3.5.3 Introducing a Bubble
So far, we regard the asset (capital) price, Qt, as an endogenous variable 
which passively reflects the real economy, although in the FA case its unan­
ticipated movements have considerable effects on economic activity through 
changes in the value of entrepreneurs’ net worth. We know, however, from 
experience in the late 1980s to early 1990s, that if asset markets are influ­
enced by non-fundamental factors, then movements in asset prices may be 
to some extent considered a further independent source of economic fluctua­
tion, supplementing the three types of shock that I have already considered 
in the model.
In order to deal with this possibility, I extend the model a little, following 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999). I introduce a bubble by assuming that the 
market price of capital, St, may differ from capital’s fundamental value, Qt. 
If a bubble exists at £, it persists and grows with probability p or crashes 
with probability 1  — p  as follows.
46This rule does not target inflation at a certain positive value but at zero. Therefore, 
it also implicitly targets the steady-state price level.
47In Chart 3 .10,1 show the standard deviations calculated under this parameterization 
regardless of the indeterminacy.
I l l
S t+ 1  -  Q t + 1  =  -  ( S t  -  Q t)  F t + 1 with probability p 
P
= 0  with probability 1  — p.
where Ft+i is here the fundamental return on capital. Therefore,
Et [S t+ i  — Q t + i  ] =  a  ( S t  — Q t )  Et F t+ i .  (3.42)
I assume 0 < p < a < l s o  that the discount value of the bubble converges 
to zero over time, while it grows until it bursts. Once the bubble crashes it 
is not expected to re-emerge, which is an assumption for simplicity. While 
the relationship between the fundamental value and the fundamental return 
on capital is prescribed by (3.19), the relationship between the market price 
and the market return, F S t + 1 , is
Ff+1 =  - * 1- (3 .4 3 )
and the relationship between the fundamental and the market return is
F?+ i =  F t + i (3.44)
This completes the extension. I now log-linearize the above equations (3.43) 
and (3.44) around the steady state, shifting the time subscripts as before.
f st = {I -  v) {yt -  xt -  k t-i)  + v st -  st- i  (3.45)
f t  = ft ~ { l  ~ a  { I -  5)} (st_i -  qt- 1 ). (3.46)
On condition that the bubble does not burst during t, the realized value in 
log-linearized terms is written as
F
st~Q t = —r.— 7 7  (*t-i “  Qt-1 ). (3.47)p ( l  -  o)
I add the above equations (3.45) through (3.47) to the log-linearized 
model in Section 3.3.4, and replace the fundamental terms, qt and ft, by the 
market terms, St and f st , respectively. 4 8  I then try generating a bubble that 
begins with a one percentage point increase in the market price of capital 
above its fundamental value and bursts four periods (one year) later. Note 
that agents in the model know only the ex-ante stochastic process governing
48I do not replace qt+i in equation (3.28) following Bernanke and Gertler (1999), assum­
ing that capital producers’ investment decision is based on the fundamental value rather 
than the market price.
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the bubble. Chart 3.12 shows responses to this exogenous disturbance in 
both the No-FA and FA cases. We can see that corporate investment in the 
FA case undergoes a large-scale decline after the collapse of bubble and it 
takes a long time for it to revert to its original steady state, while in the No- 
FA casei it returns to its steady state almost at once. This drop in investment 
in the FA case is accompanied by a fall in entrepreneurs’ net worth, which 
is greatly damaged by the collapse of bubble. The financial accelerator 
effects typically amplify shocks that affect entrepreneurs’ net worth. Here 
I set the value determining the bubble’s growth in each period, in
equation (3.47), to 2. Then, as shown in Chart 3.13, the standard deviation 
of corporate investment in the FA case (5.20) reaches a level that corresponds 
to the actual data. Thus we see that adding these bubble effects to the 
benchmark result in Section 3.4.3 achieves a close match to the observed 
data, although this result is conditional on my assumption that the bubble 
occurs independently of the other three shocks.4 9
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model which incorpo­
rates credit-market imperfections using Japanese data. The model exhibits 
financial accelerator effects, the mechanism whereby credit-market imper­
fections help to propagate or amplify various types of shocks to the economy. 
The main result is that the large volatility of Japan’s corporate investment 
can be explained by taking account of this mechanism. I examine the ro­
bustness of the results and consider some variations of the model by varying 
some underlying parameter values, adopting alternative monetary policy 
rules, and introducing an asset price bubble into the model. These experi­
ments illustrate various properties of the model and may also be of potential 
simulative interest in considering possible future states of the economy.
By varying parameterization and specification, can this model provide 
a consistent explanation for a variety of different economic situations? In 
particular, as shown in Chart 3.1, the difference in investment volatility 
between the Japanese and U.S. economies, or between Japan’s economy in
49 Both the parameterization and the specification of the bubble process here cannot 
avoid being arbitrary. That is why we did not use this extended model in the benchmark 
quantitative experiments in Section 3.4.
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the 1980s and in the 1990s is remarkably large. There may be some differ­
ences in the underlying parameter values governing the effectiveness of the 
financial accelerator, the performance of monetary policy, or the exogenous 
shock processes themselves. To investigate the causes of these differences 
represents another interesting application of this model, and I would like to 
take this as a subject for future research. 5 0  Here I can remark that the FA 
case can generally produce a wider range of results than the No-FA case by 
varying parameterization and specification.
Finally I should remark that this model is only one of a number of ways of 
introducing credit-market imperfections into a macroeconomic framework. 
There are many financial factors I ignore in this model, including banking 
sector conditions. Therefore other models might give differing quantitative, 
and possibly qualitative, results. At the same time, the dynamic general 
equilibrium framework itself still continues to develop, for instance by ex­
tension to an open economy setting .5 1  I would like to see the results of richer 
and more diverse studies developing from my approach.
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Real GDP 1.32 < 1 .0 0 1.10 <1.00> 0.94 <1.00> 1.27 <1.00>
Corporate fixed investment 3.88 <2.94> 5.32 <4.82> 4.10 <4.38> 6.44 <5.06>
Private consumption 1.03 <0.78> 0.96 <0.87> 0.82 <0.88> 1.10 <0.86>
Total working hours 1.25 <0.94> 0.62 <0.56> 0.56 <0.60> 0.68 <0.54>
Inflation rate 1.14 <0.86> 1.74 <1.58> 2.08 <2.23> 1.30 <1.02>
Monetary aggregate 1.02 <0.77> 1.61 <1.46> 1.79 <1.92> 1.40 <1.10>
(2) Cross correlations with GDP 
1. U.S.A.
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Real GDP 0.19 0.42 0.63 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.63 0.42 0.19
Corporate fixed investment -0.15 0.01 0.24 0.48 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.64 0.42
Private consumption 0.44 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.83 0.67 0.50 0.31 0.12
Total working hours 0.06 0.31 0.55 0.78 0.93 0.89 0.75 0.58 0.37
Inflation rate -0.24 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.38
Monetary aggregate 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.14 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07
2 .Japan
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Real GDP 0.35 0.57 0.61 0.73 1.00 0.73 0.61 0.57 0.35
Corporate fixed investment 0.18 0.32 0.49 0.65 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.73 0.59
Private consumption 0.23 0.44 0.29 0.24 0.65 0.25 0.12 0.20 0.07
Total working hours 0.36 0.51 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.25
Inflation rate 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.36 0.30 0.26 0.24
Monetary aggregate 0.47 0.55 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.51 0.42 0.37
< Lead GDP Lag GDP >
Notes:
1. Period: 1980/Q1-2001/Q1
2. All variables are in logarithms (except Inflation rate) and have been 
detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (A,=1600).
3. GDP, Investment, Consumption, and working hours are real and per-capita base.
4. Inflation rate (rate o f change in GDP deflator) is annual rate.
5. Numbers < ...>  in table (1) represent the relative volatility to GDP.
6. Shaded sells in tables (2) represent the peak.
Sources
Japan: National Accounts, Labor Force Survey, Bank of Japan.
U.S.: National Income and Product Accounts, Monthly Labor Review, Federal Reserve Bank.
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Chart 3.2: Notation of Variables and Parameter Values
Yt Real GDP, Output x t (Gross) Mark-up Rate
c t Private Consumption At Total Factor Productivity
It Corporate Fixed Investment Ht Labor Input Hours
Gt Government Expenditure w t Real Wage per Hour
Rt (Gross) Real Interest Rate Rnt (Gross) Nominal Interest Rate
Ft (Gross) Rate of Returns Pt Prices Level
Qt Price of Capital Good P't Optimal Price of Retailers
Kt Capital Ht (Gross) Inflation Rate
Nt Net Worth Mt Money
C/Y 0.538+ .......Steady-State Consumption Share in GDP
I/Y 0.155+ .......Steady-State Investment Share in GDP
G/Y 0.308+ .......Steady-State Exogenous Expenditures Share in GDP
(3 0.995* .......Discout factor of Households
R .........  .......Steady-State Real Gross Interest Rate (=1/(3)
y 0.9728* .......Survival Rate of Enterpreneurs
X 2+ .......Steady-State Ratio of Capital to Net Worth ( =K/N)
S 1.005+ .......Steady-State External Finance Premium ( =F/R)
0.05*  Steady-State Elasticity of S to x ( =S '(x)/S(%))
a 0.358+ .......Capital Share
8  0.021+ .......Depreciation Rate of Capital
v 0.8+ .......= (1-5) / {(l-8 )+cY/(XK)}
(p 0.25* .......Steady-State Elasticity ofl/K toQ ( =<P'(I/K)/<P(I/K))
tj, 2.737+ .......Elasticity of Labor Supply to Wage
£, £ .........  .......Parameter on Household Utility
0 0.75* .......Parameter on Price Stickiness
x  .........  .......= e_1 (l-e) (i-ep
e .........  .......Parameter on Steady-State Markup
vy 0.084® .......Parameter on Monetary Policy Rule for Output Gap
vp 0.004® .......Parameter on Monetaiy Policy Rule for Price Level
ft, 0.920® .......AR(1) Parameter on Monetary Policy Rule
pa 0.870® .......AR(1) Parameter on Technology Shock
pg 0.877®...............AR(1) Parameter on Demand Shock
an 0.104® .......Standard Deviation of the Monetary Policy Shock
aa 0.890® .......Standard Deviation of the Technology Shock
ag 1.275® ...... Standard Deviation of the Demand Shock
Notes:
1. Uppercase variables denote level, and lowercase variables denote percentage deviations fr 
the stedy-state. Uppercase variables without time subscripts denote the steady-state value*
2. Values with + are based on actual data (historical averages), with * on references to 
preceding studies, and with ® on single-equation estimation.
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Chart 3.3: R espon ses to  Monetary Policy Shock (The Core Model)
[Condition] Giving a positive (tightning) monetary policy shock to the real interest rate
consisting o f  annually 1% deviation from the steady-state only in the 1st quarter.
(1) No-FA case
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Chart 3.4: R esp o n ses  to  Technology Shock (The Core Model)
[Condition] Giving a positive technology shock consisting o f  1% deviation from 
the steady-state only in the 1st quarter.
(1) No-FA case
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Chart 3.5: R esp on ses to  Monetary Policy Shock (The Whole Model)
[Condition] Giving a positive (tightning) monetary policy shock to the nominal interest rate 
consisting o f  annually 1% deviation from the steady-state only in the 1st quarter.
(1) No-FA case
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Chart 3.6: R esp on ses to  T echnology Shock (The Whole Model)
[Condition] Giving a positive technology shock consisting o f  1% deviation from 
the steady-state only in the 1st quarter.
(1) No-FA case
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Chart 3.7: R esp on ses to  Demand Shock (The Whole Model)
[Condition] Giving a positive demand shock consisting o f  1% deviation from 
the steady-state only in the 1st quarter.
(1) N o-FA case
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Chart 3.8: S econ d  Moment Properties (Sim ulated Data)
(1) Standard deviations
No-FA case FA case
Real GDP 1.02 (0.13) <1.00> 1.07 (0.15) <1.00>
Corporate fixed investment 3.36 (0.35) <3.31> 4.36 (0.51) <4.07>
Private consumption 1.06 (0.13) <1.04> 1.03 (0.13) <0.96>
Total working hours 2.17 (0.22) <2.13> 2.32 (0.32) <2.17>
Inflation rate 2.28 (0.21) <2.24> 2.26 (0.28) <2.11>
Monetary aggregate 1.65 (0.20) <1.63> 1.56 (0.21) <1.45>
(2) Cross correlations with GDP 
1. No-FA case







































































































































































































































1. All variables are percentage deviations from their steady-state values and have been 
detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Af 1600).
2. Numbers < ...>  in table (1) represent the relative volatility to GDP.
3. Numbers (...) represent the sample standard error.
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Chart 3.9: Alternative Parameter Values





25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Real GDP 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.18 1.07 1.01
Corporate fixed investment 3.36 3.36 3.36 5.13 4.36 3.77
Private consumption 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.03 1.04
Total working hours 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.47 2.32 2.21
Inflation rate 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.31 2.26 2.22
Monetary aggregate 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.59 1.56 1.56
< External Internal > < External Internal >






0=0.9 0=0.75 0=0.65 0=0.9 0=0.75 0=0.65
Real GDP 1.47 1.02 0.93 1.70 1.07 0.93
Corporate fixed investment 6.65 3.36 2.60 8.72 4.36 2.92
Private consumption 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.03 1.04
Total working hours 3.21 2.17 1.70 3.58 2.32 1.77
Inflation rate 0.67 2.28 3.23 0.65 2.26 3.21
Monetary aggregate 1.35 1.65 1.76 1.25 1.56 1.68
< Sticky Flexible > < Sticky flexible >





T|h=oo n„=2.737 m=0.035 r\h=°° n„=2.737 Ui=0.035
Real GDP 1.05 1.02 0.98 1.11 1.07 0.94
Corporate fixed investment 3.47 3.36 3.12 4.40 4.36 1.98
Private consumption 1.07 1.06 1.26 1.03 1.03 1.93
Total working hours 2.28 2.17 0.75 2.43 2.32 0.61
Inflation rate 1.91 2.28 7.50 1.86 2.26 7.63
Monetary aggregate 1.62 1.65 2.02 1.54 1.56 1.73
< Elastic Inelastic > < Elastic Inelastic >
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Chart 3.10: Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
(1) Varying parameterization (the price-level reaction rule) 
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Real GDP 1 .2 1 1.03 1.19 1 . 0 2 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.98 0.67
Corporate fixed investment 3.91 3.46 3.81 3.36 4.45 4.39 2.73 2.83 1.79
Private consumption 1 . 2 0 1.07 1.18 1.06 1 . 2 2 1 . 2 0 1 . 0 1 1.04 0.84
Total working hours 2 . 1 0 2.23 2.05 2.17 2.97 2.90 1.09 1 . 0 0 1 .2 1
Inflation rate 2 . 1 1 2.37 2.03 2.28 4.06 4.42 0.60 0.44 1.07
Monetary aggregate 1.81 1.72 1.76 1.65 2.61 2.81 0.98 1.03 0.71
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Real GDP 1.34 1.09 1.31 1.07 0 . 8 6 0.77 0.96 0.99 0.63
Corporate fixed investment 5.25 4.49 5.10 4.36 5.01 4.91 2.78 2.90 1.49
Private consumption 1.19 1.04 1.17 1.03 1 .0 1 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 2 1.05 0 . 8 8
Total working hours 2.38 2.38 2.32 2.32 2.77 2.69 1.13 1 . 0 2 1 .2 1
Inflation rate 2.24 2.34 2.16 2.26 3.39 3.63 0.61 0.45 1.04
Monetary aggregate 1.81 1.60 1.76 1.56 2 . 0 0 2.15 0.98 1.03 0.72
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Real GDP 1.03 1 . 1 2 (0.95) 0.95 1.09 1.19 (1 .0 2 ) 1 .0 1
Corporate fixed investment 3.46 3.88 (2.90) 2 . 8 6 4.49 5.16 (3.85) 3.76
Private consumption 1.07 1.16 (0.99) 0.98 1.04 1 . 1 0 (0.99) 0.99
Total working hours 2.23 2.45 (1.84) 1.81 2.38 2.62 (2.04) 2 . 0 0
Inflation rate 2.37 2.78 (2 .0 1 ) 1.95 2.34 2.74 (2 .1 1 ) 2.05
Monetary aggregate 1.72 1.95 (1.31) 1.28 1.60 1.81 (1.31) 1.29

















Chart 3.11: Alternative M onetary Policy Rules
5.0






increasing v, Benchmark 
(0.Q84,0.004)










(Standard deviation of Real GDP)
Notes:
1. The standard deviations of GDP and Inflation for each parameterization of
our benchmark price-level reaction rule in both No-FA and FA cases (tables (1) 
in Chart 3.10) are plotted.
2. ( . . . . , . . . . ) represents the set o f reaction parameter values (vy , vp).
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Chart 3.12: R esp o n ses  to  Bubble P ro cess
[Condition] Generating a bubble that begins with one percentage point increase
above the fundamental value in the 1st quarter and bursts in the 5th quarter.
(1) No-FA case
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Chart 3.13: Adding Bubble Effects
No-FA case FA case
Benchmark Adding Bubble Benchmark Adding Bubble
Real GDP 1.13 <1.00> 1.29 <1.00> 1.17 <1.00> 1.35 <1.00>
Corporate Fixed Investment 3.26 <2.88> 4.83 <3.75> 4.05 <3.46> 5.64 <4.19>
Private Consumption 1.35 <1.19> 1.39 <1.08> 1.31 <1.12> 1.35 <1.00>
Total Working Hours 1.60 <1.42> 1.85 <1.43> 1.71 <1.46> 1.98 <1.47>
Price Level 0.67 <0.59> 0.68 <0.53> 0.68 <0.5 8> 0.69 <0.51>
Monetary Aggregate 1.87 <1.65> 1.90 <1.47> 1.78 <1.52> 1.82 <1.35>
Notes: <...> represents the relative volatility to output.
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